This article raises the question of the possibility of formulating a merely declaratory claim in the contentious-administrative process, under the Peruvian legal system. To do this, it begins by defining the contours of the merely declaratory claim and describing the typology of cases that would fit into this assumption. Then, reasons are provided that support the possibility of raising such a claim, focusing on the need to provide effective and full judicial protection, as well as the need to overcome states of uncertainty. Finally, some objections that could be raised are analyzed, and answers are provided.

The expiration is a new legal institution in the Peruvian sanctioning procedure. Its incorporation in the Administrative Procedure Act occurred with the modifications made by the Legislative Decree N° 1272 at the end of 2016. As such, its regulation is not free of loopholes (despite its short duration, the law was again modified on 2018) and already has been subject to different interpretations by different public administrations. In this paper, I aim to give an answer to some of the questions that have arisen in the short life of the “expiration” rule.

En nuestro ordenamiento jurídico se exige una garantía para interponer un recurso de apelación en el marco de un proceso de selección de contratistas para el Estado. El propósito principal de ello es desincentivar las apelaciones temerarias que terminan retrasando innecesariamente los procesos de selección, privando al Estado de los bienes, servicios y obras que requiere. Sin embargo, la regulación de dicha garantía y la mala comprensión de su finalidad han terminado por convertirla en un sobre desincentivo que perjudica tanto a los particulares como al Estado. Por ello, en el presente artículo se explican las principales características de esta figura, sus ventajas y desventajas, los problemas que crea y las alternativas que se considera podrían mejorar la regulación.

La caducidad es una figura relativamente nueva en el procedimiento sancionador peruano. Su incorporación en la Ley del Procedimiento Administrativo General se produjo con las modificaciones realizadas por el Decreto Legislativo N° 1272 a fines del año 2016. Su regulación no está libre de vacíos (pese al poco tiempo de vigencia, fue modificada en el año 2018) y ha sido objeto de diversas interpretaciones por parte de las diversas entidades de la administración. En este artículo pretendo brindar respuesta a algunas de las interrogantes que se han abierto paso en el corto tiempo de vigencia de la caducidad.

Regulation, understood in a broad sense, encompasses all forms in which the state intervenes in the lives of individuals (through regulations and administrative acts). However, over the years, the approach to regulation has changed, especially regarding regulatory techniques and ways to ensure compliance. In this context, responsive regulation emerges as a paradigm shift that involves regulating according to the context. This shift can have significant implications for the Peruvian public procurement regime, specifically in its sanctioning regime. Under a responsive regulation logic, a response strategy can be promoted that better harmonizes the interests of the state (as contractor and regulator) and the private sector (as contractors).

The expiration is a new legal institution in the Peruvian sanctioning procedure. Its incorporation in the Administrative Procedure Act occurred with the modifications made by the Legislative Decree N° 1272 at the end of 2016. As such, its regulation is not free of loopholes (despite its short duration, the law was again modified on 2018) and already has been subject to different interpretations by different public administrations. In this paper, I aim to give an answer to some of the questions that have arisen in the short life of the “expiration” rule.

Regulation, understood in a broad sense, encompasses all forms in which the state intervenes in the lives of individuals (through regulations and administrative acts). However, over the years, the approach to regulation has changed, especially regarding regulatory techniques and ways to ensure compliance. In this context, responsive regulation emerges as a paradigm shift that involves regulating according to the context. This shift can have significant implications for the Peruvian public procurement regime, specifically in its sanctioning regime. Under a responsive regulation logic, a response strategy can be promoted that better harmonizes the interests of the state (as contractor and regulator) and the private sector (as contractors).

Despite the evolution of the private investment promotion regime in relation to investment projects under private initiatives, there are many shortcomings in its regulation, especially at the evaluation stage, which creates serious disincentives for attracting private investors. One of these defects derives from its consideration as requests of graces and of how the Administration understands this type of petitions. Having this problem in mind, we propose a rereading of the nature of private initiatives to ensure that decisions taken by the Public Administration in this regard are subject to a true control of legality. 

El Decreto Legislativo N° 1272 que modificó la Ley N° 27444 introdujo importantes cambios en el régimen sancionador, incluyendo a los principios que rigen la potestad sancionadora. Los principios son normas esenciales que no sólo limitan la potestad sancionadora, sino que guían su correcto ejercicio. En ese sentido, resulta indispensable estudiar los alcances, fundamentos y problemas que presentan los principios que han sufrido modificaciones a la luz de la nueva normativa, a saber, el principio del debido procedimiento, proporcionalidad, tipicidad, retroactividad benigna y el recientemente incorporado principio de culpabilidad.

The special nature of the contractor selection procedure and the source hierarchy of the State Procurement Law have been used as an argument to support the non-application of the interoperability rule within the framework of these procedures. Being in disagreement with this position, we sustain in the article that the special nature of the selection procedure does not negate the application of the informalism principle that underpins the interoperability rule. Likewise, we maintain that the common character of the Law of General Administrative Procedure, where the principle of informalism is enshrined, requires a reinterpretation of the hierarchy of sources of the State Contracting Law.

Despite the evolution of the private investment promotion regime in relation to investment projects under private initiatives, there are many shortcomings in its regulation, especially at the evaluation stage, which creates serious disincentives for attracting private investors. One of these defects derives from its consideration as requests of graces and of how the Administration understands this type of petitions. Having this problem in mind, we propose a rereading of the nature of private initiatives to ensure that decisions taken by the Public Administration in this regard are subject to a true control of legality. 

The special nature of the contractor selection procedure and the source hierarchy of the State Procurement Law have been used as an argument to support the non-application of the interoperability rule within the framework of these procedures. Being in disagreement with this position, we sustain in the article that the special nature of the selection procedure does not negate the application of the informalism principle that underpins the interoperability rule. Likewise, we maintain that the common character of the Law of General Administrative Procedure, where the principle of informalism is enshrined, requires a reinterpretation of the hierarchy of sources of the State Contracting Law.

Contracts are celebrated to be complied with. Therefore, breaches of contract are always an irregular and undesirable situation. That being the case, the law guarantees several protection measures against non-compliance, both in private and in public contracts. In the latter case, since the breach can come from either the contractor or the State, the law protects them both. However, Peruvian regulations do not establish the same consequences for the same occurrence, and as a result there are more burdensome consequences if the party which incurred in non-compliance was the contractor. This article seeks to explain that differentiation, through a critical analysis.

Despite the evolution of the private investment promotion regime in relation to investment projects under private initiatives, there are many shortcomings in its regulation, especially at the evaluation stage, which creates serious disincentives for attracting private investors. One of these defects derives from its consideration as requests of graces and of how the Administration understands this type of petitions. Having this problem in mind, we propose a rereading of the nature of private initiatives to ensure that decisions taken by the Public Administration in this regard are subject to a true control of legality. 

The special nature of the contractor selection procedure and the source hierarchy of the State Procurement Law have been used as an argument to support the non-application of the interoperability rule within the framework of these procedures. Being in disagreement with this position, we sustain in the article that the special nature of the selection procedure does not negate the application of the informalism principle that underpins the interoperability rule. Likewise, we maintain that the common character of the Law of General Administrative Procedure, where the principle of informalism is enshrined, requires a reinterpretation of the hierarchy of sources of the State Contracting Law.

Contracts are celebrated to be complied with. Therefore, breaches of contract are always an irregular and undesirable situation. That being the case, the law guarantees several protection measures against non-compliance, both in private and in public contracts. In the latter case, since the breach can come from either the contractor or the State, the law protects them both. However, Peruvian regulations do not establish the same consequences for the same occurrence, and as a result there are more burdensome consequences if the party which incurred in non-compliance was the contractor. This article seeks to explain that differentiation, through a critical analysis.