This paper is an introductory study of the doctrine of suspect classifications based on the case law of the Peruvian Constitutional Court and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. It aims to describe the special features of this doctrine as well as to critically analyze its proposed justification and the consequences of its application: The strict scrutiny test. To achieve this purpose, this work describes the case law in which both courts have explicitly mentioned this doctrine. Based on this study, the author identifies that the foundation of this doctrine lies in the notion of equality as recognition of vulnerable groups and that both tribunals have established as its main effect the application of a strict scrutiny test. Finally, the author critically assesses these jurisprudential findings.

This work has the purpose of clarifying and critically evaluating the doctrine of «unconstitutional constitutional amendments» of the Peruvian Constitutional Tribunal. From a mainly constitutional perspective, although complimented with a legal philosophy approach, this work defends that the Constitutional Tribunal basically maintains a substantialist or value-based conception of the Constitution—where constitutional amendments are subject not only to institutional limits, but also to material limits. It is also evident that this implicit conception, despite its plausibility, suffers from important imbalances that need to be corrected.

This work has the purpose of clarifying and critically evaluating the doctrine of «unconstitutional constitutional amendments» of the Peruvian Constitutional Tribunal. From a mainly constitutional perspective, although complimented with a legal philosophy approach, this work defends that the Constitutional Tribunal basically maintains a substantialist or value-based conception of the Constitution where constitutional amendments are subject not only to institutional limits, but also to material limits. It is also evident that this implicit conception, despite its plausibility, suffers from important imbalances that need to be corrected.

This paper is an introductory study of the doctrine of suspect classifications based on the case law of the Peruvian Constitutional Court and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. It aims to describe the special features of this doctrine as well as to critically analyze its proposed justification and the consequences of its application: The strict scrutiny test. To achieve this purpose, this work describes the case law in which both courts have explicitly mentioned this doctrine. Based on this study, the author identifies that the foundation of this doctrine lies in the notion of equality as recognition of vulnerable groups and that both tribunals have established as its main effect the application of a strict scrutiny test. Finally, the author critically assesses these jurisprudential findings.

This paper is an introductory study of the doctrine of suspect classifications based on the case law of the Peruvian Constitutional Court and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. It aims to describe the special features of this doctrine as well as to critically analyze its proposed justification and the consequences of its application: The strict scrutiny test. To achieve this purpose, this work describes the case law in which both courts have explicitly mentioned this doctrine. Based on this study, the author identifies that the foundation of this doctrine lies in the notion of equality as recognition of vulnerable groups and that both tribunals have established as its main effect the application of a strict scrutiny test. Finally, the author critically assesses these jurisprudential findings.

This work has the purpose of clarifying and critically evaluating the doctrine of «unconstitutional constitutional amendments» of the Peruvian Constitutional Tribunal. From a mainly constitutional perspective, although complimented with a legal philosophy approach, this work defends that the Constitutional Tribunal basically maintains a substantialist or value-based conception of the Constitution—where constitutional amendments are subject not only to institutional limits, but also to material limits. It is also evident that this implicit conception, despite its plausibility, suffers from important imbalances that need to be corrected.