Frequently, reflections on the legal philosophical conceptions of law are posited, at least implicitly, as independent from reflections on the ethics of the legal professions. However, this brief work aims to show that a central aspect that defines the nuances of such conceptions —specifically, the way in which the thesis of the necessary connection between law and morality is upheld— is essential for addressing practical consequences in the ethical or moral exercise of legal professions, particularly that of lawyers. Starting from the real or apparent tension between the lawyer's duty of «truthfulness and justice» and the duty of «diligence and confidentiality» when acting as a defense attorney in a criminal trial, this paper will defend the thesis that law and morality —without being identified or confused with one another— maintain an «intrinsic» relationship. This relat...

Since no more than ten years Jeremy Waldron has been working on a legal and philosophical conception of dignity that conceives it mainly as «rank» or «status», and that understands it —not exclusively, but significantly— as the basis of human rights. This approach is proposed as an alternative to the rival conceptions of dignity that are currently found in legal scholarship and in the rulings of high courts, such like the Kantian, the Roman-Catholic and the Dworkinian. This work will try to prove that, despite its great hints, the Waldron’s thesis about dignity has at least three relevant problems which arise from the insufficient clarification of what he calls the «underlying idea» of human dignity, which I will classify as: that of «weakness», that of «harmonization-determination», and that of «secularity». The goal will be to show that it is possible to test a concep...

Frequently, reflections on the legal philosophical conceptions of law are posited, at least implicitly, as independent from reflections on the ethics of the legal professions. However, this brief work aims to show that a central aspect that defines the nuances of such conceptions —specifically, the way in which the thesis of the necessary connection between law and morality is upheld— is essential for addressing practical consequences in the ethical or moral exercise of legal professions, particularly that of lawyers. Starting from the real or apparent tension between the lawyer's duty of «truthfulness and justice» and the duty of «diligence and confidentiality» when acting as a defense attorney in a criminal trial, this paper will defend the thesis that law and morality —without being identified or confused with one another— maintain an «intrinsic» relationship. This relat...

Since no more than ten years Jeremy Waldron has been working on a legal and philosophical conception of dignity that conceives it mainly as «rank» or «status», and that understands it —not exclusively, but significantly— as the basis of human rights. This approach is proposed as an alternative to the rival conceptions of dignity that are currently found in legal scholarship and in the rulings of high courts, such like the Kantian, the Roman-Catholic and the Dworkinian. This work will try to prove that, despite its great hints, the Waldron’s thesis about dignity has at least three relevant problems which arise from the insufficient clarification of what he calls the «underlying idea» of human dignity, which I will classify as: that of «weakness», that of «harmonization-determination», and that of «secularity». The goal will be to show that it is possible to test a concep...

Since no more than ten years Jeremy Waldron has been working on a legal and philosophical conception of dignity that conceives it mainly as «rank» or «status», and that understands it —not exclusively, but significantly— as the basis of human rights. This approach is proposed as an alternative to the rival conceptions of dignity that are currently found in legal scholarship and in the rulings of high courts, such like the Kantian, the Roman-Catholic and the Dworkinian. This work will try to prove that, despite its great hints, the Waldron’s thesis about dignity has at least three relevant problems which arise from the insufficient clarification of what he calls the «underlying idea» of human dignity, which I will classify as: that of «weakness», that of «harmonization-determination», and that of «secularity». The goal will be to show that it is possible to test a concep...

Frequently, reflections on the legal philosophical conceptions of law are posited, at least implicitly, as independent from reflections on the ethics of the legal professions. However, this brief work aims to show that a central aspect that defines the nuances of such conceptions —specifically, the way in which the thesis of the necessary connection between law and morality is upheld— is essential for addressing practical consequences in the ethical or moral exercise of legal professions, particularly that of lawyers. Starting from the real or apparent tension between the lawyer's duty of «truthfulness and justice» and the duty of «diligence and confidentiality» when acting as a defense attorney in a criminal trial, this paper will defend the thesis that law and morality —without being identified or confused with one another— maintain an «intrinsic» relationship. This relat...

This work has the purpose of clarifying and critically evaluating the doctrine of «unconstitutional constitutional amendments» of the Peruvian Constitutional Tribunal. From a mainly constitutional perspective, although complimented with a legal philosophy approach, this work defends that the Constitutional Tribunal basically maintains a substantialist or value-based conception of the Constitution—where constitutional amendments are subject not only to institutional limits, but also to material limits. It is also evident that this implicit conception, despite its plausibility, suffers from important imbalances that need to be corrected.

This work has the purpose of clarifying and critically evaluating the doctrine of «unconstitutional constitutional amendments» of the Peruvian Constitutional Tribunal. From a mainly constitutional perspective, although complimented with a legal philosophy approach, this work defends that the Constitutional Tribunal basically maintains a substantialist or value-based conception of the Constitution where constitutional amendments are subject not only to institutional limits, but also to material limits. It is also evident that this implicit conception, despite its plausibility, suffers from important imbalances that need to be corrected.

This work has the purpose of clarifying and critically evaluating the doctrine of «unconstitutional constitutional amendments» of the Peruvian Constitutional Tribunal. From a mainly constitutional perspective, although complimented with a legal philosophy approach, this work defends that the Constitutional Tribunal basically maintains a substantialist or value-based conception of the Constitution—where constitutional amendments are subject not only to institutional limits, but also to material limits. It is also evident that this implicit conception, despite its plausibility, suffers from important imbalances that need to be corrected.