La tesis de la conexión intrínseca entre derecho y moral: sus consecuencias para la ética profesional del abogado

• Autor: Chávez-Fernández Postigo, José Carlos
• Formato: artículo
• Fecha de Publicación: 2025
• Institución: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
• Repositorio: PUCP-Institucional
• Lenguaje: español
• OAI Identifier: oai:repositorio.pucp.edu.pe:20.500.14657/203823
• Enlace del recurso: https://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/derechopucp/article/view/29829/27504; http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14657/203823; https://doi.org/10.18800/derechopucp.202501.003
• Nivel de acceso: acceso abierto
• Materia: Legal philosophical conceptions; Law-morality connection; Professional ethics of the lawyer; Duty of truthfulness; Duty to serve justice; Duty of confidentiality; Duty of diligence; Concepciones iusfilosóficas; Conexión derecho-moral; Ética profesional del abogado; Deber de veracidad; Deber de servir a la justicia; Deber de reserva; Deber de diligencia; https://purl.org/pe-repo/ocde/ford#5.05.01

Frequently, reflections on the legal philosophical conceptions of law are posited, at least implicitly, as independent from reflections on the ethics of the legal professions. However, this brief work aims to show that a central aspect that defines the nuances of such conceptions —specifically, the way in which the thesis of the necessary connection between law and morality is upheld— is essential for addressing practical consequences in the ethical or moral exercise of legal professions, particularly that of lawyers. Starting from the real or apparent tension between the lawyer's duty of «truthfulness and justice» and the duty of «diligence and confidentiality» when acting as a defense attorney in a criminal trial, this paper will defend the thesis that law and morality —without being identified or confused with one another— maintain an «intrinsic» relationship. This relationship allows for the compatibility of a lawyer's professional practice with these duties, while supporting the view that morality subordinates law, insofar as both are primarily practical or prescriptive reasoning-knowledge disciplines, rather than technical or instrumental ones, in Aristotelian terminology. This will lead to the conclusion that both judges and lawyers who participate in such legal proceedings are bound in their professional practice by a morality that can reasonably be considered objective, while acknowledging the unique implications of this connection for the lawyer's professional work.