Earnings Management and Contests for Control: An Analysis of European Family Firms

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In this paper, the influence of large shareholders on earnings management in family-owned firms is analyzed using a sample of firms from nine European countries. How contests for control for the largest shareholder and the existence of a controlling coalition in family-owned firms affect earnings ma...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Jara, Mauricio, López-Iturriaga, Félix J.
Formato: artículo
Fecha de Publicación:2011
Institución:Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
Repositorio:PUCP-Institucional
Lenguaje:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:repositorio.pucp.edu.pe:20.500.14657/194787
Enlace del recurso:https://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/194787
Nivel de acceso:acceso abierto
Materia:Corporate control
Discretionary accruals
Earnings management
Family firms
https://purl.org/pe-repo/ocde/ford#5.02.04
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spelling Jara, MauricioLópez-Iturriaga, Félix J.2023-07-21T19:18:13Z2023-07-21T19:18:13Z2011https://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/194787In this paper, the influence of large shareholders on earnings management in family-owned firms is analyzed using a sample of firms from nine European countries. How contests for control for the largest shareholder and the existence of a controlling coalition in family-owned firms affect earnings management is considered. It was found that increases in the contestability of control by the largest shareholder reduce earnings management in family-owned firms. The results also show that in firms in which the largest shareholder is a family member, a second or third family shareholder increases discretionary accruals.engPontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. CENTRUMPEurn:issn:1851-6599info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0Journal of CENTRUM Cathedra, Vol. 4, Issue 1reponame:PUCP-Institucionalinstname:Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perúinstacron:PUCPCorporate controlDiscretionary accrualsEarnings managementFamily firmshttps://purl.org/pe-repo/ocde/ford#5.02.04Earnings Management and Contests for Control: An Analysis of European Family Firmsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleArtículoTHUMBNAILJCC-4.1-53.pdf.jpgJCC-4.1-53.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg30064https://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/bitstreams/5da1dc5a-1d3b-43b9-b811-86d171522309/download007e4d4c18e6d15468f8e13ecced3b31MD52falseAnonymousREADORIGINALJCC-4.1-53.pdfJCC-4.1-53.pdfTexto completoapplication/pdf245734https://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/bitstreams/49c6cb7f-e811-4cde-9492-b14b6ab6d3a7/download26a338e976f40a7bb4e6e74983e44a6dMD51trueAnonymousREAD20.500.14657/194787oai:repositorio.pucp.edu.pe:20.500.14657/1947872025-04-11 09:58:18.413http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessopen.accesshttps://repositorio.pucp.edu.peRepositorio Institucional de la PUCPrepositorio@pucp.pe
dc.title.en_US.fl_str_mv Earnings Management and Contests for Control: An Analysis of European Family Firms
title Earnings Management and Contests for Control: An Analysis of European Family Firms
spellingShingle Earnings Management and Contests for Control: An Analysis of European Family Firms
Jara, Mauricio
Corporate control
Discretionary accruals
Earnings management
Family firms
https://purl.org/pe-repo/ocde/ford#5.02.04
title_short Earnings Management and Contests for Control: An Analysis of European Family Firms
title_full Earnings Management and Contests for Control: An Analysis of European Family Firms
title_fullStr Earnings Management and Contests for Control: An Analysis of European Family Firms
title_full_unstemmed Earnings Management and Contests for Control: An Analysis of European Family Firms
title_sort Earnings Management and Contests for Control: An Analysis of European Family Firms
author Jara, Mauricio
author_facet Jara, Mauricio
López-Iturriaga, Félix J.
author_role author
author2 López-Iturriaga, Félix J.
author2_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Jara, Mauricio
López-Iturriaga, Félix J.
dc.subject.en_US.fl_str_mv Corporate control
Discretionary accruals
Earnings management
Family firms
topic Corporate control
Discretionary accruals
Earnings management
Family firms
https://purl.org/pe-repo/ocde/ford#5.02.04
dc.subject.ocde.none.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/pe-repo/ocde/ford#5.02.04
description In this paper, the influence of large shareholders on earnings management in family-owned firms is analyzed using a sample of firms from nine European countries. How contests for control for the largest shareholder and the existence of a controlling coalition in family-owned firms affect earnings management is considered. It was found that increases in the contestability of control by the largest shareholder reduce earnings management in family-owned firms. The results also show that in firms in which the largest shareholder is a family member, a second or third family shareholder increases discretionary accruals.
publishDate 2011
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2023-07-21T19:18:13Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2023-07-21T19:18:13Z
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv 2011
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.other.none.fl_str_mv Artículo
format article
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv https://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/194787
url https://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/194787
dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.ispartof.none.fl_str_mv urn:issn:1851-6599
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eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. CENTRUM
dc.publisher.country.none.fl_str_mv PE
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. CENTRUM
dc.source.es_ES.fl_str_mv Journal of CENTRUM Cathedra, Vol. 4, Issue 1
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:PUCP-Institucional
instname:Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
instacron:PUCP
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Earnings Management and Contests for Control: An Analysis of European Family Firms
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