Earnings Management and Contests for Control: An Analysis of European Family Firms

• Autores: Jara, Mauricio, López-Iturriaga, Félix J.
• Formato: artículo
• Fecha de Publicación: 2011
• Institución: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
• Repositorio: PUCP-Institucional
• Lenguaje: inglés
• OAI Identifier: oai:repositorio.pucp.edu.pe:20.500.14657/194787
• Enlace del recurso: https://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/194787
• Nivel de acceso: acceso abierto
• Materia: Corporate control; Discretionary accruals; Earnings management; Family firms; https://purl.org/pe-repo/ocde/ford#5.02.04

In this paper, the influence of large shareholders on earnings management in family-owned firms is analyzed using a sample of firms from nine European countries. How contests for control for the largest shareholder and the existence of a controlling coalition in family-owned firms affect earnings management is considered. It was found that increases in the contestability of control by the largest shareholder reduce earnings management in family-owned firms. The results also show that in firms in which the largest shareholder is a family member, a second or third family shareholder increases discretionary accruals.