Superación del representacionalismo e inmanentismo en la génesis de la fenomenología husserliana de la percepción

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Husserl’s overcoming of the Modern representationalist and immanentist notions of consciousness and knowledge is tied to the early development of his sui generis concept of intentionality. This development is the result of logical and psychological studies, the latter laying open different modalitie...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Rizo-Patrón de Lerner, Rosemary
Formato: artículo
Fecha de Publicación:2005
Institución:Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
Repositorio:PUCP-Institucional
Lenguaje:español
OAI Identifier:oai:repositorio.pucp.edu.pe:20.500.14657/112981
Enlace del recurso:http://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/arete/article/view/2176/2108
https://doi.org/10.18800/arete.200502.002
Nivel de acceso:acceso abierto
Materia:Philosophy
https://purl.org/pe-repo/ocde/ford#6.03.01
Descripción
Sumario:Husserl’s overcoming of the Modern representationalist and immanentist notions of consciousness and knowledge is tied to the early development of his sui generis concept of intentionality. This development is the result of logical and psychological studies, the latter laying open different modalities of intuition: the founded modes –eidetic and categorial– and the sensible founding modes, all of which presuppose the most basic and founding mode –that of perception. Although the Husserlian concept of intentionality is determined by Husserl’s discovery of "ideality” in his logicsemantic investigations, no less relevant are Husserl psychological studies and the early development of a non-representationalist notion of perception. This paper will attempt to highlight some salient features of Husserl’s early phenomenology of perception and its overcoming of representationalism.
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