The naturalized epistemology of legal principles

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From its radicality the naturalized epistemology has a remarkably different perspective to the traditional epistemology, as far as the explanation, orientation and justification ofthe disciplines of the knowledge.In appealing to analytical philosophy, naturalized epistemology, applied to the juridic...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Godenzi Alegre, Jorge Luis
Formato: artículo
Fecha de Publicación:2018
Institución:Universidad Ricardo Palma
Repositorio:Revistas - Universidad Ricardo Palma
Lenguaje:español
OAI Identifier:oai:oai.revistas.urp.edu.pe:article/1234
Enlace del recurso:http://revistas.urp.edu.pe/index.php/Inkarri/article/view/1234
Nivel de acceso:acceso abierto
Materia:Law
Principles
Rules
Weighting
Optimization
Moral
Positivism
Morality
Epistemology
Ley
Principios
Reglas
Ponderación
Optimización
Derecho
Positivismo
Moralidad
Epistemología
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oai_identifier_str oai:oai.revistas.urp.edu.pe:article/1234
network_acronym_str REVURP
network_name_str Revistas - Universidad Ricardo Palma
repository_id_str
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The naturalized epistemology of legal principles
La epistemología naturalizada de los principios jurídicos
title The naturalized epistemology of legal principles
spellingShingle The naturalized epistemology of legal principles
Godenzi Alegre, Jorge Luis
Law
Principles
Rules
Weighting
Optimization
Moral
Positivism
Morality
Epistemology
Ley
Principios
Reglas
Ponderación
Optimización
Moral
Derecho
Positivismo
Moralidad
Epistemología
title_short The naturalized epistemology of legal principles
title_full The naturalized epistemology of legal principles
title_fullStr The naturalized epistemology of legal principles
title_full_unstemmed The naturalized epistemology of legal principles
title_sort The naturalized epistemology of legal principles
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Godenzi Alegre, Jorge Luis
author Godenzi Alegre, Jorge Luis
author_facet Godenzi Alegre, Jorge Luis
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Law
Principles
Rules
Weighting
Optimization
Moral
Positivism
Morality
Epistemology
Ley
Principios
Reglas
Ponderación
Optimización
Moral
Derecho
Positivismo
Moralidad
Epistemología
topic Law
Principles
Rules
Weighting
Optimization
Moral
Positivism
Morality
Epistemology
Ley
Principios
Reglas
Ponderación
Optimización
Moral
Derecho
Positivismo
Moralidad
Epistemología
description From its radicality the naturalized epistemology has a remarkably different perspective to the traditional epistemology, as far as the explanation, orientation and justification ofthe disciplines of the knowledge.In appealing to analytical philosophy, naturalized epistemology, applied to the juridical sciences, postulates that for the purposes of knowing some concept of law and the categories that emanate from this discipline, it is necessary to establish what are the beliefs about them Categories, one of them, that of legal principles, is to indicate their primacy and validity, on the one hand, and on the other, to determine if they coincide with what happens in their application and, therefore, if it is justified to sustain such beliefs .To reach the epistemological status of explanation and justification, these beliefs must satisfy a finite number of necessary and sufficient conditions. The necessary conditions, stipulated by the criteria used to define the notion of legal principles, are to note the meaning of the law. The belief, overwhelmingly majority, is oriented to establish that the law and the law are the same; But it could be stipulated, from a sufficient condition, to recognize that in the substrate of this discipline of knowledge, to explain, guide and justify it better, is that both law and law are totally different notions; The law is more relevant than the law because it is nourished, among other aspects, of principles that underlie the cultural fabric, constituting itself as a new type of rules that incorporate morality, with a general character and open to the legal order, , From now on, a frontal attack on traditional legal positivism.In holding this view that law is above laws, the frontiers that once separated the legal sciences from morality are blurred, since the moral relevance of the principles, which may be invoked, constitute in certain circumstances A legal duty and a new type of rules that must be observed by the operators of the right, under the same conditions as the other legal norms. Thus, the legal principles will not be different from the common laws and can be identified as such, by their content, that is to say becausethey are morally the most adequate to justify in a coherent way the set of legal rules, and also to explain the decisions Judicial, whose north must be that of the preservation of the fundamental rights guaranteeing in a minimum, legal security and social peace.This naturalized approach to epistemology may be able to solve a number of problems that have been acquired with the old traditional epistemology, such as the problem of normative statements, indeterminism of legal gaps, legal interpretation, penumbra , etc.The approach and refutation of epistemological criteria based on necessary and sufficient conditions is what stimulates this academic article that aspires to rethink new bases for the explanation and justification of the legal principles.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018-01-26
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info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
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status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://revistas.urp.edu.pe/index.php/Inkarri/article/view/1234
10.31381/iusinkarri.vn6.1234
url http://revistas.urp.edu.pe/index.php/Inkarri/article/view/1234
identifier_str_mv 10.31381/iusinkarri.vn6.1234
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language spa
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv http://revistas.urp.edu.pe/index.php/Inkarri/article/view/1234/1126
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv Derechos de autor 2018 Ius Inkarri
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Derechos de autor 2018 Ius Inkarri
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad Ricardo Palma, Rectorado
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad Ricardo Palma, Rectorado
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Ius Inkarri; Vol. 6 Núm. 6 (2017); 157-172
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spelling The naturalized epistemology of legal principlesLa epistemología naturalizada de los principios jurídicosGodenzi Alegre, Jorge LuisLawPrinciplesRulesWeightingOptimizationMoralPositivismMoralityEpistemologyLeyPrincipiosReglasPonderaciónOptimizaciónMoralDerechoPositivismoMoralidadEpistemologíaFrom its radicality the naturalized epistemology has a remarkably different perspective to the traditional epistemology, as far as the explanation, orientation and justification ofthe disciplines of the knowledge.In appealing to analytical philosophy, naturalized epistemology, applied to the juridical sciences, postulates that for the purposes of knowing some concept of law and the categories that emanate from this discipline, it is necessary to establish what are the beliefs about them Categories, one of them, that of legal principles, is to indicate their primacy and validity, on the one hand, and on the other, to determine if they coincide with what happens in their application and, therefore, if it is justified to sustain such beliefs .To reach the epistemological status of explanation and justification, these beliefs must satisfy a finite number of necessary and sufficient conditions. The necessary conditions, stipulated by the criteria used to define the notion of legal principles, are to note the meaning of the law. The belief, overwhelmingly majority, is oriented to establish that the law and the law are the same; But it could be stipulated, from a sufficient condition, to recognize that in the substrate of this discipline of knowledge, to explain, guide and justify it better, is that both law and law are totally different notions; The law is more relevant than the law because it is nourished, among other aspects, of principles that underlie the cultural fabric, constituting itself as a new type of rules that incorporate morality, with a general character and open to the legal order, , From now on, a frontal attack on traditional legal positivism.In holding this view that law is above laws, the frontiers that once separated the legal sciences from morality are blurred, since the moral relevance of the principles, which may be invoked, constitute in certain circumstances A legal duty and a new type of rules that must be observed by the operators of the right, under the same conditions as the other legal norms. Thus, the legal principles will not be different from the common laws and can be identified as such, by their content, that is to say becausethey are morally the most adequate to justify in a coherent way the set of legal rules, and also to explain the decisions Judicial, whose north must be that of the preservation of the fundamental rights guaranteeing in a minimum, legal security and social peace.This naturalized approach to epistemology may be able to solve a number of problems that have been acquired with the old traditional epistemology, such as the problem of normative statements, indeterminism of legal gaps, legal interpretation, penumbra , etc.The approach and refutation of epistemological criteria based on necessary and sufficient conditions is what stimulates this academic article that aspires to rethink new bases for the explanation and justification of the legal principles.Desde su radicalidad la epistemología naturalizada tiene una perspectiva notablemente diferente a la epistemología tradicional, en lo que concierne a la explicación, orientación y justificación de las disciplinas del conocimiento.Al apelar a la filosofía analítica la epistemología naturalizada, aplicada a las ciencias jurídicas, postula que para los efectos de conocer algún concepto del erecho y de las categorías que se desprenden de esta disciplina, es necesario establecer cuáles son las creencias que se tienen sobre dichas categorías, una de ellas, la de los principios jurídicos, consiste en señalar su primacía y vigencia, de una parte, y de la otra determinar si coinciden con lo que ocurre en su aplicación y, por lo tanto, si es justificado sostener tales creencias.Para alcanzar el estatuto epistemológico de explicación y justificación, estas creencias deben satisfacer una cantidad finita de condiciones necesarias y suficientes. Las condiciones necesarias, estipuladas mediante los criterios que se emplean para precisar la noción que se tiene respecto de los principios jurídicos, consisten en advertir el sentido que se tiene respecto del derecho. La creencia, abrumadoramente mayoritaria, está orientada a establecer que la ley y el derecho son lo mismo; pero cabría estipular, desde una condición suficiente, reconocer que en el sustrato de esta disciplina del conocimiento, para explicarla, orientarla y justificarla mejor, es que tanto la ley como el derecho son nociones totalmente diferentes; el derecho es más relevante que la ley por que éste se nutre, entre otros aspectos, de principios que subyacen en el entramado cultural, constituyéndose como un nuevo tipo de normas que incorporan moralidad, con carácter general y abierto al ordenamiento jurídico, lo cual supone, desde ya, un frontal ataque al positivismo jurídico tradicional.Al sostener esta tesis de que el derecho se encuentra por encima de las leyes, las fronteras que antaño separaban a las ciencias jurídicas de la moral se difuminan, puesto que la relevancia moral de los principios, que se pueden eventualmente invocar, constituyen en determinadas circunstancias un deber jurídico y un nuevo tipo de normas que deben ser observadas por los operadores del derecho, en las mismas condiciones que las demás normas legales. De este modo, los principios jurídicos no serán distintos de las leyes comunes y podrán ser identificados como tales, por su contenido, es decir porque moralmente son los más adecuados para justificar de modo coherente al conjunto de reglas jurídicas, y también para explicar las decisiones judiciales, cuyo norte ha de ser el de la preservación de los derechos fundamentales garantizando en un mínimo, la seguridad jurídica y la paz social.Este enfoque naturalizado de la epistemología puede ser capaz de resolver una serie de problemas que se han adquirido con la antigua epistemología tradicional, tales como el problema de los enunciados normativos, el indeterminismo de las lagunas del derecho, la interpretación legal, las zonas de penumbra, etc.El planteamiento y refutación de criterios epistemológicos basados en condiciones necesarias y suficientes es lo que estimula a este artículo académico que aspira a replantear nuevas bases para la explicación y justificación de los principios jurídicos.Universidad Ricardo Palma, Rectorado2018-01-26info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttp://revistas.urp.edu.pe/index.php/Inkarri/article/view/123410.31381/iusinkarri.vn6.1234Ius Inkarri; Vol. 6 Núm. 6 (2017); 157-1722519-72742410-593710.31381/iusinkarri.vn6reponame:Revistas - Universidad Ricardo Palmainstname:Universidad Ricardo Palmainstacron:URPspahttp://revistas.urp.edu.pe/index.php/Inkarri/article/view/1234/1126Derechos de autor 2018 Ius Inkarrihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:oai.revistas.urp.edu.pe:article/12342023-10-14T15:35:31Z
score 13.971837
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