Why autocracies promote political and economic instability?

• Autor: Zegarra, Luis Felipe
• Formato: artículo
• Fecha de Publicación: 2001
• Institución: Universidad del Pacífico
• Repositorio: Revistas - Universidad del Pacífico
• Lenguaje: español
• OAI Identifier: oai:ojs.revistas.up.edu.pe:article/509
• Enlace del recurso: https://revistas.up.edu.pe/index.php/apuntes/article/view/509
• Nivel de acceso: acceso abierto

Some authors think autocracies, unlike democracies, can follow economic policies that promote private investment and economic growth, without being influenced by demands of some lobbies, which pretend to mantain and expand their privilegies. Odria's autocracy (1948-1956) seems to be an example of the autocratic advantage. During Odria's government, concentration of political power permitted Odria to pursue an ortodox economic program and promote privte investment on mining and exporting agriculture. However, those policies were possible because the lobbies very close to the government in those years (exporters) promoted such policies. If the most powerful lobbies had demanded protectionist policies, economic policies would have been totally different. On the other hand, even though at the beginning of his government, Odria could impose a liberal economic program, along the years he had to concede some populist privilegies to popular organizations in order to guarantee political stability. Actually, Odria's government is a clear example that autocracies, instead of pursuing ortodox economic programs during a long period, provoke instability and populism.