“Skepticism and Idealism in G.E Moore’s ‘Proof of an External World’”

• Autor: Burdman, Federico
• Formato: artículo
• Fecha de Publicación: 2015
• Institución: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
• Repositorio: Revistas - Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
• Lenguaje: español
• OAI Identifier: oai:revistaspuc:article/13425
• Enlace del recurso: http://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/arete/article/view/13425
• Nivel de acceso: acceso abierto
• Materia: idealism; skepticism; Cartesianism; common sense; certainty; idealismo; escepticismo; cartesianismo; sentido común; certeza

G.E. Moore’s argument in “Proof of an External World” seems to beg the question against the skeptic and to miss the point of the challenge posed by skeptical hypotheses. I propose an interpretation that frees the argument from both charges. Starting from a distinction between the way Moore understood his dialectical position against the idealist and the skeptic, I attempt to illuminate the conception of skepticism that lies behind his argument. I propose that the argument’s core is found in a strong anti-Cartesian statement, even though its relevance for epistemology is to be found in its potential as a stance regarding justification which is closer to the problematic of Pyrrhonic skepticism.