The Overcoming of Representationalism and Immanentism at the Genesis of Husserl’s Phenomenology of Perception

• Autor: Rizo-Patrón, Rosemary
• Formato: artículo
• Fecha de Publicación: 2005
• Institución: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
• Repositorio: Revistas - Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
• Lenguaje: español
• OAI Identifier: oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/2176
• Enlace del recurso: http://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/arete/article/view/2176
• Nivel de acceso: acceso abierto

Husserl’s overcoming of the Modern representationalist and immanentist notions of consciousness and knowledge is tied to the early development of his sui generis concept of intentionality. This development is the result of logical and psychological studies, the latter laying open different modalities of intuition: the founded modes –eidetic and categorial– and the sensible founding modes, all of which presuppose the most basic and founding mode –that of perception. Although the Husserlian concept of intentionality is determined by Husserl’s discovery of “ideality” in his logicsemantic investigations, no less relevant are Husserl psychological studies and the early development of a non-representationalist notion of perception. This paper will attempt to highlight some salient features of Husserl’s early phenomenology of perception and its overcoming of representationalism.