The Right to Observe the Laws in the Constitution of 1933

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After the fall of the Leguía regime, a series of modifications were introduced that were later included in the Constituent Assembly of 1931. One of them was the primacy of the parliamentary system, which agreed, among other reforms, to annul the presidential veto. Thus, the Constitutional Charter of...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Bernales Ballesteros, Enrique
Formato: artículo
Fecha de Publicación:1971
Institución:Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
Repositorio:Revistas - Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
Lenguaje:español
OAI Identifier:oai:revistaspuc:article/12738
Enlace del recurso:http://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/derechopucp/article/view/12738
Nivel de acceso:acceso abierto
Materia:Presidential veto
Constitution of 1933
parliamentary regime
presidentialism
Transitory Provision
Bicameralism
Provisional Senate
Veto presidencial
Constitución de 1933
régimen parlamentarista
presidencialismo
Disposición Transitoria
Bicameralidad
Senado Provisorio
Descripción
Sumario:After the fall of the Leguía regime, a series of modifications were introduced that were later included in the Constituent Assembly of 1931. One of them was the primacy of the parliamentary system, which agreed, among other reforms, to annul the presidential veto. Thus, the Constitutional Charter of 1933 established that the president was prevented from observing the laws. Although the will of the legislators had been to withdraw the right to veto from the Executive Branch, the Constitution itself recognized this right in the Sixth Transitory Provision, causing a problem of interpretation. However, according to the author, these Provisions were subordinated to the implementation of the bicameral regime, which was the only condition for their existence, and therefore, once the Provisional Senate was established, they disappeared. To that extent, the right to veto, provisionally granted in the Sixth Transitory Provision, would operate until the implementation of the bicameral system disappeared. In this context, this article analyzes the convoluted path that the right to veto suffered by the Executive under the 1933 Constitution.
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