El artículo no presenta resumen.

This article has three purposes in order to contribute to the ongoing debate around the doctrine of conventionality control. First, to determine its current definition according to the own jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Secondly, to present the most relevant consequences that, both in constitutional law and in public international law, suppose the acceptance of this doctrine in question. In the third place, we intend to show why the eventual States’ approval of this doctrine must take into account, preferably, the parliament participation rather than the national high courts’ involvement.

No presenta resumen

This article has three purposes in order to contribute to the ongoing debate around the doctrine of conventionality control. First, to determine its current definition according to the own jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Secondly, to present the most relevant consequences that, both in constitutional law and in public international law, suppose the acceptance of this doctrine in question. In the third place, we intend to show why the eventual States’ approval of this doctrine must take into account, preferably, the parliament participation rather than the national high courts’ involvement.

El artículo no presenta resumen.

This article has three purposes in order to contribute to the ongoing debate around the doctrine of conventionality control. First, to determine its current definition according to the own jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Secondly, to present the most relevant consequences that, both in constitutional law and in public international law, suppose the acceptance of this doctrine in question. In the third place, we intend to show why the eventual States’ approval of this doctrine must take into account, preferably, the parliament participation rather than the national high courts’ involvement.

En el presente artículo, los autores internacionales analizan la viabilidad de los diagnósticos genéticos preimplantatorios en el ordenamiento jurídico argentino y su relación con el caso “Artavia Murillo y otros versus Costa Rica”. En este sentido, los autores analizan, en primer lugar, si las decisiones de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, en los casos en que Argentina no es parte, son vinculantes para el citado país. En segundo lugar, los autores exponen las razones por las que lo resuelto en el caso “Artavia Murillo” no debe tener influencia en la toma de decisiones en Argentina; entre ellas: ignorar el principio pro homine, la diferencia de contextos, entre otros.