This paper presents a general approach to the problem of the rationality of judicial decisions in a context of rationality limited by biases; specifically, we aim to answer the question of whether judges have the duty to judge without cognitive biases. Despite the practical importance of the issue, there are no legal provisions, or studies, that expressly resolve it. I argue that there is an institutional legal duty to design the justice system that mitigates the risk of cognitive biases in judicial decisions; but judges have a deontological duty to implement measures to manage the risk that their decisions are affected by cognitive biases. I argue, first, that the limits to human rationality do not eliminate the possibility of judges making rational legal decisions; since rationality is contextual and in the legal field it is possible to delimit the object of the decision and the releva...

En el presente trabajo se analiza el caso de los hermanos Fernando y Patricia Gonzáles Rivero1 a quienes la Fiscalía les atribuye haber cometido delitos contra la fe pública por haber encargado la tramitación de una escritura pública que resultó falsificada y por presentarla a los Registros Públicos para su inscripción. En el trascurso del proceso penal se presentaron diversos problemas procesales y sustantivos que son materia de análisis en el presente trabajo, entre los que destacan: una indebida actuación fiscal en el procedimiento frustrado de negociación penal realizado en la etapa de la investigación preparatoria; y en la etapa intermedia, la vulneración al principio de correlación entre formalización y acusación y la indebida denegatoria de la excepción de improcedencia de acción. En el juicio oral la defensa estructura una estrategia audaz que implica un juicio ...

This paper presents a general approach to the problem of the rationality of judicial decisions in a context of rationality limited by biases; specifically, we aim to answer the question of whether judges have the duty to judge without cognitive biases. Despite the practical importance of the issue, there are no legal provisions, or studies, that expressly resolve it. I argue that there is an institutional legal duty to design the justice system that mitigates the risk of cognitive biases in judicial decisions; but judges have a deontological duty to implement measures to manage the risk that their decisions are affected by cognitive biases. I argue, first, that the limits to human rationality do not eliminate the possibility of judges making rational legal decisions; since rationality is contextual and in the legal field it is possible to delimit the object of the decision and the releva...