El “derecho” a la desconexión se trata de un enunciado construido desde el punto de vista dogmático, antes bien que normativo. En efecto, son pocos los ordenamientos jurídicos que han consagrado un “derecho” a la desconexión. Además, la desconexión tiene un estrecho vínculo con el tiempo de trabajo, el tiempo de descanso, la salud y seguridad laboral, así como también influye en la llamada conciliación entre vida privada o personal y trabajo. Es por ello que corresponde analizar si existe la necesidad de consagración de este derecho como categoría autónoma, o si por el contrario, su contenido jurídico y límites -delineados dogmáticamente-, encuentran amparo en institutos clásicos en materia de tiempo de trabajo. Además, resultaría irreal dejar de considerar la vinculación necesaria entre esta temática y el régimen de estabilidad de cada sistema normativo. En...

The “right” to the disconnection is a statement built from the dogmatic point of view, rather than normative. In fact, there are few legal systems that have enshrined a “right” to disconnection. In addition, disconnection has a close link with working time, rest time, health and safety at work, as well as influencing the so-called conciliation between private or personal life and work. That is why it is necessary to analyze whether there is a need for the consecration of this right as an autonomous category, or if, on the contrary, its legal content and limits -deleted dogmatically- are found in classic institutes in terms of working time.Furthermore, it would be unrealistic to stop considering the necessary link between this issue and the stability regime of each regulatory system. In the case of Uruguay, it is worth asking: how useful is the consecration of a “right” to dis...

The “right” to the disconnection is a statement built from the dogmatic point of view, rather than normative. In fact, there are few legal systems that have enshrined a “right” to disconnection. In addition, disconnection has a close link with working time, rest time, health and safety at work, as well as influencing the so-called conciliation between private or personal life and work. That is why it is necessary to analyze whether there is a need for the consecration of this right as an autonomous category, or if, on the contrary, its legal content and limits -deleted dogmatically- are found in classic institutes in terms of working time.Furthermore, it would be unrealistic to stop considering the necessary link between this issue and the stability regime of each regulatory system. In the case of Uruguay, it is worth asking: how useful is the consecration of a “right” to dis...