In this text you can see the debate between the American Philosopher Ronald Dworkin and the so called by him archimedean skepticism, which is a kind of ethical skepticism. In that way, we will see first which was the beginning of ethical skepticism in the history of Philosophy, and how was its development through three summits. In the last summit, we will examine the moral error theory of the famous skeptic of Twenty Century, John Leslie Mackie, whom Dworkin wants to oppose philosophically. Finally, we will show the decisive contribution of Ronald Dworkin to the Philosophy of Ethics: the utilization of Hume’s Law as refutation of ethical skepticism.

In this text you can see the debate between the American Philosopher Ronald Dworkin and the so called by him archimedean skepticism, which is a kind of ethical skepticism. In that way, we will see first which was the beginning of ethical skepticism in the history of Philosophy, and how was its development through three summits. In the last summit, we will examine the moral error theory of the famous skeptic of Twenty Century, John Leslie Mackie, whom Dworkin wants to oppose philosophically. Finally, we will show the decisive contribution of Ronald Dworkin to the Philosophy of Ethics: the utilization of Hume’s Law as refutation of ethical skepticism.

La tarea de esta investigación es responder a la pregunta de en qué consiste la objetividad y de qué forma se va presentando no solo en un nivel ético, sino también en el nivel de la moral y en el de la política; y también cómo a través de ella se puede generar respuestas exitosas o no a los dilemas morales de nuestra vida cotidiana. Para ese fin, hemos asumido como hipótesis que el concepto de objetividad en la filosofía moral de Ronald Dworkin se desdobla en dos fases: una negativa (lo que no es la objetividad) y una positiva (la que dice sobre el contenido de dicho concepto). En el capítulo I se desarrolla esa fase negativa y cómo ella es contrapuesta al escepticismo moral, cuyos principales representantes también manejan una noción de la ‘objetividad’, aunque errada, según la visión de Dworkin. Luego, en el capítulo II, se explica cómo Dworkin dota de contenido...