El Expediente N.° 4268/2021.TCE versa sobre un procedimiento administrativo sancionador iniciado contra la empresa SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC SYSTEMS S.A. por presuntamente (i) haber contratado con el Estado estando impedida para ello y (ii) por presentar información inexacta, en el marco de una contratación pública. La infracción imputada del punto (i) está tipificada en el literal c) del Art. 50, inciso 50.1 de la Ley de Contrataciones con el Estado y se sustenta en la existencia del vínculo de consanguineidad entre una trabajadora de PETROPERÚ y el Gerente General de la empresa denunciada; situación regulada en los literales f), h) y k) del Art. 11, numeral 11.1. Por su lado, la infracción del punto (ii) está tipificada en el literal i) del Art. 50, inciso 50.1 de la Ley de Contrataciones con el Estado y está sustentada en la presentación de una Declaración Jurada, en la que no ...

This article presents a comparative analysis of two models of state regulation: The traditional ‘command and control’ approach, focused on the imposition of sanctions, and the responsive approach, which advocates for a more flexible system based on cooperation, persuasion, and the use of incentives to promote regulatory compliance. Through this comparison, the authors reflect on which model may lead to a more effective and context-appropriate regulatory framework.In this context, the article examines the incentive regimes implemented by the Peruvian regulatory agencies OSITRAN and OEFA, assessing whether they align with the principles of responsive regulation. It analyzes how these mechanisms have been designed, the extent to which they have been implemented in practice, and the key challenges they face in becoming effective tools within the Peru’s regulatory system.

This article presents a comparative analysis of two models of state regulation: The traditional ‘command and control’ approach, focused on the imposition of sanctions, and the responsive approach, which advocates for a more flexible system based on cooperation, persuasion, and the use of incentives to promote regulatory compliance. Through this comparison, the authors reflect on which model may lead to a more effective and context-appropriate regulatory framework.In this context, the article examines the incentive regimes implemented by the Peruvian regulatory agencies OSITRAN and OEFA, assessing whether they align with the principles of responsive regulation. It analyzes how these mechanisms have been designed, the extent to which they have been implemented in practice, and the key challenges they face in becoming effective tools within the Peru’s regulatory system.