In this paper the author seeks to explain why modern life in Peru is chaotic. To this purpose, the author makes use of the concept of communicative action introduced by Habermas. The author finds that modernity in Peru has failed due to the scarcity of the sort of action that seeks understanding. Instead, modernity in Peru develops through actions that seek to impose themselves, and that constitutes a regression towards a primitive and non-modern action.

In this paper, the author presents an explanation of the truth that is obtained from scientific practice. In this way, truth is revealed as functionality, but functionality is understood as negotiation between the researcher, the community and the researched world. However, the author also finds the need not to close the explanation of the truth in a single answer; and that is why he presents a pluralistic explanation of truth that conceives functionality as crosses all the others, and thus accepting that. There are other ways to explain the truth.

In this paper the author seeks to explain why modern life in Peru is chaotic. To this purpose, the author makes use of the concept of communicative action introduced by Habermas. The author finds that modernity in Peru has failed due to the scarcity of the sort of action that seeks understanding. Instead, modernity in Peru develops through actions that seek to impose themselves, and that constitutes a regression towards a primitive and non-modern action.

In this paper, the author presents an explanation of the truth that is obtained from scientific practice. In this way, truth is revealed as functionality, but functionality is understood as negotiation between the researcher, the community and the researched world. However, the author also finds the need not to close the explanation of the truth in a single answer; and that is why he presents a pluralistic explanation of truth that conceives functionality as crosses all the others, and thus accepting that. There are other ways to explain the truth.

En este artículo, el autor presenta la acusación que hace el cientificismo a la filosofía, específicamente a la metafísica, alpunto de sostener el fin de la metafísica con el corolario del fin de la filosofía. El autor propone que dicha acusación parte deuna distorsión en la descripción de la misma ciencia quien se niega a reconocer su carácter incierto. Al final, el autorpropone una reconstrucción de la filosofía haciendo que esta se acerque a la ciencia, pero a una nueva forma de ciencia queestá lejos de la descripción del cientificismo.