En el presente artículo analizaremos la propuesta neokantiana de Paul Ricoeur de articular la memoria y la historia. El primer paso consiste en tomar el concepto de representación como modo de volver comparables ambos modos de referirse al pasado. En el siguiente, se articulan estos dos tipos de representaciones retrotrayéndose a la ontología temporal de Heidegger. Entre las consecuencias de esta fundamentación se desprende que las posibilidades de los actores pasados pueden ser reinterpretadas en el presente. Esta situación legitima la imposibilidad de establecer reglas fijas para articular la relación entre memoria e historia. Se concluirá discutiendo si el filósofo no cae en una suerte de falacia de la parte por el todo, en el sentido en que su descripción se basa en un tipo específico de hacer historia y sus prescripciones parecieran tener un alcance general.

“The Ontological Foundation of the Relationship between Memory andHistory in Paul Ricoeur’s Memory, History, Forgetting”. This paper will analyze PaulRicoeur’s Neo-Kantian proposal to articulate memory and history. The first step isto consider the concept of representation as a way to make both means of referringto the past comparable. In the next step, these two types of representationsare articulated by leading back to Heidegger’s temporal ontology. Amongst otherconsequences of this foundation, it follows that the possibilities of past agentscan be reinterpreted in the present. This situation legitimizes the impossibility ofsetting fixed rules for the articulation between memory and history. Finally, thispaper will discuss whether the philosopher does, or does not, commit a fallacyof composition, since his description is based on a specific form of history, whilehis prescript...

“The Ontological Foundation of the Relationship between Memory andHistory in Paul Ricoeur’s Memory, History, Forgetting”. This paper will analyze PaulRicoeur’s Neo-Kantian proposal to articulate memory and history. The first step isto consider the concept of representation as a way to make both means of referringto the past comparable. In the next step, these two types of representationsare articulated by leading back to Heidegger’s temporal ontology. Amongst otherconsequences of this foundation, it follows that the possibilities of past agentscan be reinterpreted in the present. This situation legitimizes the impossibility ofsetting fixed rules for the articulation between memory and history. Finally, thispaper will discuss whether the philosopher does, or does not, commit a fallacyof composition, since his description is based on a specific form of history, whilehis prescript...