Although factors leading to selfless acts, such as charitable donations, have been a central concern in political sciences, voluntary donations are among the most atypical and less well-known public revenue-raising sources. In this article, we explore which factors influence people's donations to their government. We conduct an artefactual field experiment in Peru where subjects anonymously decide how much of an endowment they freely donate to the government. We run six sessions with a sample that is representative of the taxpayer population of Metropolitan Lima regarding age, gender, and socioeconomic conditions. Our results suggest that donations depend on the subject's support to the government, the average donation by other subjects (social information) and their beliefs about the average donation of others (perceived social norms).

This paper uses lab-in-the-field experiments and theory to explore why people give money to gov-ernments. We assume that giving is motivated by outcome–oriented or consequentialist norms, andconditional on (a) others’ behavior and (b) beliefs about how competent the government is. The evidencefrom a lab experiment in Peru is in line with this. On the other hand, we analyze the potential effectsof two policies to increase giving, observing that less people give zero if they are informed about (i)two specific government projects (a subway line and a children’s hospital) or (ii) that some well-knownOlympic medalist pays punctually her taxes, according to public information released by the Peruviantax Agency. Our findings contribute to a burgeoning literature on tax morale and are arguably relevantto understand taxpayers’ non-selfish reasons to pay (or evade) their taxes.

We report data from an experiment in Peru where subjects anonymously decide how much of their endowment they donate to the Peruvian government. The standard rational choice model and several well-known models of non-selfish preferences predict zero giving. Yet we observe that around 75% of the subjects give something (N = 164), with substantial heterogeneity. Further, individual donations depend negatively on (a) beliefs about corruption in Peru and positively on (b) level of support of the actual government and (c) beliefs about the average donation by other subjects. Our data is consistent with a theory based on consequentialist norms, which we develop in detail. This paper contributes to a recent literature on tax morale emphasizing the importance of non-standard motivations on tax compliance, and suggests that taxpayers are willing to give money to the government (e.g., paying taxes)...

El propósito de la investigación es conocer cuál es el efecto de la sustitución del cemento en un 5 y 10% por ceniza de cascará de maní, en la resistencia de un mortero, estudio que se realizará en la ciudad de Chimbote, 2017, utilizando agregado grueso de la cantera Vesique y con un cemento portland tipo I, con el fin de encontrar alternativas de materiales para su aplicación en el campo de la ingeniería civil. Dentro de su metodología se empezó determinando el rango de activación de la ceniza de cascara de maní del Centro Poblado Cascajal - Provincia del Santa mediante la Activación Térmica Diferencial seguido se determinó la composición química de la ceniza de cascara de maní utilizando Fluorescencia de Rayos X, continuando se determinó el potencial hidrogeno del cemento, ceniza de cascara de maní y compuesto de cemento con ceniza de cascara de maní para así det...

aframirez@ulima.edu.pe; raul.lopez@uam.es

We are grateful to participants at the II Annual Congress of Behavioral Economics and Finance at the University of Lima for helpful comments and research assistance from María Alvarado.