The following work attempts to broaden the perspective regarding beliefs considering that traditionally only beliefs of the conscious and linguistic type have been considered. In other words, it has been assumed that human cognition only creates beliefs from our ability to produce language. Contrary to this, the article suggests that cognition implies a spectrum of beliefs that also encompasses those that are neither linguistic nor conscious, and that emotions are beliefs as propositional survival programs. In order to accomplish this, theories of the philosophy of the mind, contemporary psychoanalysis, Buddhist psychology and neuroscience are treated. Taking all in consideration, we can assure that the amount of beliefs we have is much wider than those of which we are linguistically aware.

The following work attempts to broaden the perspective regarding beliefs considering that traditionally only beliefs of the conscious and linguistic type have been considered. In other words, it has been assumed that human cognition only creates beliefs from our ability to produce language. Contrary to this, the article suggests that cognition implies a spectrum of beliefs that also encompasses those that are neither linguistic nor conscious, and that emotions are beliefs as propositional survival programs. In order to accomplish this, theories of the philosophy of the mind, contemporary psychoanalysis, Buddhist psychology and neuroscience are treated. Taking all in consideration, we can assure that the amount of beliefs we have is much wider than those of which we are linguistically aware.

The following work attempts to broaden the perspective regarding beliefs considering that traditionally only beliefs of the conscious and linguistic type have been considered. In other words, it has been assumed that human cognition only creates beliefs from our ability to produce language. Contrary to this, the article suggests that cognition implies a spectrum of beliefs that also encompasses those that are neither linguistic nor conscious, and that emotions are beliefs as propositional survival programs. In order to accomplish this, theories of the philosophy of the mind, contemporary psychoanalysis, Buddhist psychology and neuroscience are treated. Taking all in consideration, we can assure that the amount of beliefs we have is much wider than those of which we are linguistically aware.

The following work attempts to broaden the perspective regarding beliefs considering that traditionally only beliefs of the conscious and linguistic type have been considered. In other words, it has been assumed that human cognition only creates beliefs from our ability to produce language. Contrary to this, the article suggests that cognition implies a spectrum of beliefs that also encompasses those that are neither linguistic nor conscious, and that emotions are beliefs as propositional survival programs. In order to accomplish this, theories of the philosophy of the mind, contemporary psychoanalysis, Buddhist psychology and neuroscience are treated. Taking all in consideration, we can assure that the amount of beliefs we have is much wider than those of which we are linguistically aware.

El libro en cuestión trata de responder a la siguiente pregunta: ¿qué es real y qué no es real en los casos de santidad y posesiones demoníacas? El autor responderá a esa pregunta tomando en cuenta la historicidad de los cánones y, sobre todo, contextualizando cada caso con la efervescencia propia de la época. La descripción es rica y exhaustiva, además de insistente en la mencionada contextualización.

Analiza si se encuentra justificada la reducción de los fenómenos a su carácter sociológico o político, como ha sido empleada la reducción de los fenómenos a un solo ámbito de este, a partir de filósofos partícipes del giro posmoderno. A partir de la pregunta planteada, la tesis que se defiende es la siguiente: la reducción del análisis de los fenómenos a un solo aspecto de este está injustificado por el carácter complejo de los fenómenos en cuanto a la necesidad de buscar constantemente nueva evidencia comprendida a partir de distintos marcos teóricos, de manera que se logre obtener proposiciones con mayor probabilidad de ser verdaderas. La posmodernidad reduccionista ha intentado reducir el análisis de la realidad a un solo ámbito de esta1. Bajo esta perspectiva, se evita usar una argumentación compleja que considere distintas perspectivas, disciplinas y ciencias. L...

La creencia de que la racionalidad es igual a la verdad aún es creída ahora, sobre todo por aquellos que defienden la Decision Theory como método decisorio para establecer la racionalidad de un conjunto creencias y acciones en tanto descripción de una persona. Incluso, varias acusaciones de irracionalidad están dirigidas hacia el contenido de una creencia, ni siquiera hacia la forma lógica (única que podría ser juzgada de racional). Esta tesis no solo asume como absurdo que los contenidos de las creencias sean irracionales, sino que afirma que un humano no puede efectuar inferencias irracionales. El trabajo, entonces, está dividido en dos partes. La primera intenta demostrar que el humano solamente conoce la realidad racionalmente. Es decir, la realidad es únicamente conocida lógicamente, pues ese es el principio de la comprensión en general: el humano conoce el mundo mediant...