Legal recognition and history in Kant. Notes for a possible overcoming of the contradiction between history and law
Descripción del Articulo
Recognition in Kant's philosophy, recognition in general necessary to face the difficulties of the constitution, legitimation and maintenance of the modern state, has been presented in philosophical reflection with a markedly legal bias; Thus, attempts to broaden the legal conception of this re...
| Autor: | |
|---|---|
| Formato: | artículo |
| Fecha de Publicación: | 2019 |
| Institución: | Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Huanta |
| Repositorio: | Puriq |
| Lenguaje: | español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs2.www.revistas.unah.edu.pe:article/6 |
| Enlace del recurso: | https://www.revistas.unah.edu.pe/index.php/puriq/article/view/6 |
| Nivel de acceso: | acceso abierto |
| Materia: | Kant filosofía del derecho arbitrio reconocimiento filosofía de la historia filosofia do direito filosofia da história arbitragem reconhecimento philosophy of law philosophy of history arbitrariness recognition |
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Legal recognition and history in Kant. Notes for a possible overcoming of the contradiction between history and law Reconocimiento jurídico e historia en Kant. Apuntes para una posible superación de la contradicción entre historia y derecho Reconhecimento legal e história em Kant. Notas para uma possível superação da contradição entre a história e a lei |
| title |
Legal recognition and history in Kant. Notes for a possible overcoming of the contradiction between history and law |
| spellingShingle |
Legal recognition and history in Kant. Notes for a possible overcoming of the contradiction between history and law Quispe Pérez, Ítalo Jaime Kant filosofía del derecho arbitrio reconocimiento filosofía de la historia Kant filosofia do direito filosofia da história arbitragem reconhecimento Kant philosophy of law philosophy of history arbitrariness recognition |
| title_short |
Legal recognition and history in Kant. Notes for a possible overcoming of the contradiction between history and law |
| title_full |
Legal recognition and history in Kant. Notes for a possible overcoming of the contradiction between history and law |
| title_fullStr |
Legal recognition and history in Kant. Notes for a possible overcoming of the contradiction between history and law |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Legal recognition and history in Kant. Notes for a possible overcoming of the contradiction between history and law |
| title_sort |
Legal recognition and history in Kant. Notes for a possible overcoming of the contradiction between history and law |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Quispe Pérez, Ítalo Jaime |
| author |
Quispe Pérez, Ítalo Jaime |
| author_facet |
Quispe Pérez, Ítalo Jaime |
| author_role |
author |
| dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
Kant filosofía del derecho arbitrio reconocimiento filosofía de la historia Kant filosofia do direito filosofia da história arbitragem reconhecimento Kant philosophy of law philosophy of history arbitrariness recognition |
| topic |
Kant filosofía del derecho arbitrio reconocimiento filosofía de la historia Kant filosofia do direito filosofia da história arbitragem reconhecimento Kant philosophy of law philosophy of history arbitrariness recognition |
| description |
Recognition in Kant's philosophy, recognition in general necessary to face the difficulties of the constitution, legitimation and maintenance of the modern state, has been presented in philosophical reflection with a markedly legal bias; Thus, attempts to broaden the legal conception of this recognition towards historical criteria that allow us to contemplate particular interests or the plurality of life forms are practically non-existent. The present article aims to argue that Kantian legal recognition presents a historical basis that allows us to understand the contradictions between history and law. I also argue that the possibility of a recognition that attends to transcendental concepts and, however, does not escape the history of private agents, offers better alternatives to political philosophy to face the problem of how to decide which claims are legitimate and which are not. They are, problems that the Hegelian-inspired recognition theory has not completely solved, according to Honneth (Pereira, 2010). |
| publishDate |
2019 |
| dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2019-07-05 |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
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article |
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publishedVersion |
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https://www.revistas.unah.edu.pe/index.php/puriq/article/view/6 10.37073/puriq.1.01.6 |
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https://www.revistas.unah.edu.pe/index.php/puriq/article/view/6 |
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10.37073/puriq.1.01.6 |
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spa |
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spa |
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https://www.revistas.unah.edu.pe/index.php/puriq/article/view/6/4 https://www.revistas.unah.edu.pe/index.php/puriq/article/view/6/23 https://www.revistas.unah.edu.pe/index.php/puriq/article/view/6/592 https://www.revistas.unah.edu.pe/index.php/puriq/article/view/6/593 10.37073/puriq.1.01.6.g4 10.37073/puriq.1.01.6.g23 10.37073/puriq.1.6.g592 10.37073/puriq.1.6.g593 |
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Derechos de autor 2019 Ítalo Quispe Pérez https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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Derechos de autor 2019 Ítalo Quispe Pérez https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 |
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openAccess |
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application/pdf text/html text/xml application/zip |
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Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Huanta |
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Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Huanta |
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Puriq; Vol. 1 No. 01 (2019): PURIQ (January-June); 3-11 Puriq; Vol. 1 Núm. 01 (2019): PURIQ (enero-junio); 3-11 Puriq; v. 1 n. 01 (2019): PURIQ (janeiro-junho); 3-11 2707-3602 2664-4029 10.37073/puriq.1.01.2019 reponame:Puriq instname:Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Huanta instacron:UNAH |
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Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Huanta |
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UNAH |
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Legal recognition and history in Kant. Notes for a possible overcoming of the contradiction between history and lawReconocimiento jurídico e historia en Kant. Apuntes para una posible superación de la contradicción entre historia y derechoReconhecimento legal e história em Kant. Notas para uma possível superação da contradição entre a história e a leiQuispe Pérez, Ítalo JaimeKantfilosofía del derechoarbitrioreconocimientofilosofía de la historiaKantfilosofia do direitofilosofia da históriaarbitragemreconhecimentoKantphilosophy of lawphilosophy of historyarbitrarinessrecognitionRecognition in Kant's philosophy, recognition in general necessary to face the difficulties of the constitution, legitimation and maintenance of the modern state, has been presented in philosophical reflection with a markedly legal bias; Thus, attempts to broaden the legal conception of this recognition towards historical criteria that allow us to contemplate particular interests or the plurality of life forms are practically non-existent. The present article aims to argue that Kantian legal recognition presents a historical basis that allows us to understand the contradictions between history and law. I also argue that the possibility of a recognition that attends to transcendental concepts and, however, does not escape the history of private agents, offers better alternatives to political philosophy to face the problem of how to decide which claims are legitimate and which are not. They are, problems that the Hegelian-inspired recognition theory has not completely solved, according to Honneth (Pereira, 2010).El reconocimiento en la filosofía de Kant, reconocimiento en general necesario para enfrentar las dificultades de la constitución, legitimación y mantenimiento del estado moderno, se ha presentado en la reflexión filosófica con un sesgo marcadamente jurídico; de modo que, los intentos por ampliar la concepción jurídica de este reconocimiento hacia criterios históricos que permiten contemplar los intereses particulares o la pluralidad de formas de vida son prácticamente inexistentes. El presente artículo tiene como objetivo argumentar que el reconocimiento jurídico kantiano presenta una base histórica que nos permite comprender las contradicciones entre historia y derecho. Sostengo, además, que la posibilidad de un reconocimiento que atiende a conceptos trascendentales y, sin embargo, no escapa de la historia de los agentes particulares ofrece mejores alternativas a la filosofía política para encarar el problema sobre cómo decidir qué reivindicaciones son legítimas y cuáles no lo son, problemas que la teoría del reconocimiento de inspiración hegeliana no ha solucionado del todo, según Honneth (Pereira, 2010).O reconhecimento na filosofia de Kant, reconhecimento em geral necessário para enfrentar as dificuldades da constituição, legitimação e manutenção do estado moderno, tem sido apresentado na reflexão filosófica com um viés marcadamente jurídico; assim, as tentativas de ampliar a concepção jurídica deste reconhecimento em direção a critérios históricos que permitem interesses particulares ou a pluralidade de formas de vida são praticamente inexistentes. Este artigo visa argumentar que o reconhecimento jurídico kantiano tem uma base histórica que nos permite compreender as contradições entre a história e o direito. Argumento, além disso, que a possibilidade de um reconhecimento que atenda a conceitos transcendentais e ainda não escape à história de determinados agentes oferece melhores alternativas para a filosofia política enfrentar o problema de como decidir quais reivindicações são legítimas e quais não são, problemas que a teoria do reconhecimento inspirada em Hegelian não resolveu completamente, de acordo com Honneth (Pereira, 2010).Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Huanta2019-07-05info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdftext/htmltext/xmlapplication/ziphttps://www.revistas.unah.edu.pe/index.php/puriq/article/view/610.37073/puriq.1.01.6Puriq; Vol. 1 No. 01 (2019): PURIQ (January-June); 3-11Puriq; Vol. 1 Núm. 01 (2019): PURIQ (enero-junio); 3-11Puriq; v. 1 n. 01 (2019): PURIQ (janeiro-junho); 3-112707-36022664-402910.37073/puriq.1.01.2019reponame:Puriqinstname:Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Huantainstacron:UNAHspahttps://www.revistas.unah.edu.pe/index.php/puriq/article/view/6/4https://www.revistas.unah.edu.pe/index.php/puriq/article/view/6/23https://www.revistas.unah.edu.pe/index.php/puriq/article/view/6/592https://www.revistas.unah.edu.pe/index.php/puriq/article/view/6/59310.37073/puriq.1.01.6.g410.37073/puriq.1.01.6.g2310.37073/puriq.1.6.g59210.37073/puriq.1.6.g593Derechos de autor 2019 Ítalo Quispe Pérezhttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:ojs2.www.revistas.unah.edu.pe:article/62022-09-27T02:51:29Z |
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12.660138 |
Nota importante:
La información contenida en este registro es de entera responsabilidad de la institución que gestiona el repositorio institucional donde esta contenido este documento o set de datos. El CONCYTEC no se hace responsable por los contenidos (publicaciones y/o datos) accesibles a través del Repositorio Nacional Digital de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación de Acceso Abierto (ALICIA).
La información contenida en este registro es de entera responsabilidad de la institución que gestiona el repositorio institucional donde esta contenido este documento o set de datos. El CONCYTEC no se hace responsable por los contenidos (publicaciones y/o datos) accesibles a través del Repositorio Nacional Digital de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación de Acceso Abierto (ALICIA).
