Legal recognition and history in Kant. Notes for a possible overcoming of the contradiction between history and law

• Autor: Quispe Pérez, Ítalo Jaime
• Formato: artículo
• Fecha de Publicación: 2019
• Institución: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Huanta
• Repositorio: Puriq
• Lenguaje: español
• OAI Identifier: oai:ojs2.www.revistas.unah.edu.pe:article/6
• Enlace del recurso: https://www.revistas.unah.edu.pe/index.php/puriq/article/view/6
• Nivel de acceso: acceso abierto
• Materia: Kant; filosofía del derecho; arbitrio; reconocimiento; filosofía de la historia; filosofia do direito; filosofia da história; arbitragem; reconhecimento; philosophy of law; philosophy of history; arbitrariness; recognition

Recognition in Kant's philosophy, recognition in general necessary to face the difficulties of the constitution, legitimation and maintenance of the modern state, has been presented in philosophical reflection with a markedly legal bias; Thus, attempts to broaden the legal conception of this recognition towards historical criteria that allow us to contemplate particular interests or the plurality of life forms are practically non-existent. The present article aims to argue that Kantian legal recognition presents a historical basis that allows us to understand the contradictions between history and law. I also argue that the possibility of a recognition that attends to transcendental concepts and, however, does not escape the history of private agents, offers better alternatives to political philosophy to face the problem of how to decide which claims are legitimate and which are not. They are, problems that the Hegelian-inspired recognition theory has not completely solved, according to Honneth (Pereira, 2010).