The Distinction between ‘Deed’ and ‘Action’ in face of the ‘Right of Knowledge’

• Autor: Mañalich R., Juan Pablo
• Formato: artículo
• Fecha de Publicación: 2023
• Institución: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
• Repositorio: Revistas - Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
• Lenguaje: español
• OAI Identifier: oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/27120
• Enlace del recurso: http://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/arete/article/view/27120
• Nivel de acceso: acceso abierto
• Materia: Hegel; Action; Imputation; Intention; Moral luck; Acción; Imputación; Intención; Suerte moral

This article reconstructs the notion of action that, anchored in a wider account of imputation practices, Hegel develops in the “Morality” chapter of his Philosophy of Right, beginning with a preliminary clarification of what it means that “crime” designates something that has the status of an action. Considering a set of premises found in some recent analytically oriented interpretations of Hegel’s work developed by Robert Brandom and Michael Quante, I examine the distinction proposed by Hegel between the concepts of deed and action, to then clarify the meaning of the “·right of knowledge” and its relationship to the “right of intention”. This enables one to make explicit the particular form of “compatiblism” that can be extracted from Hegel’s philosophy as a way to face the problem of moral luck.