Are Epicurus’ and Lucretius’ Arguments Against the Fear of Death Convincing?

• Autor: Rosell, Sergi
• Formato: artículo
• Fecha de Publicación: 2022
• Institución: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
• Repositorio: Revistas - Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
• Lenguaje: español
• OAI Identifier: oai:revistaspuc:article/26326
• Enlace del recurso: http://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/arete/article/view/26326
• Nivel de acceso: acceso abierto
• Materia: Epicureanism; Evil; Hedonism; Sensation; Privation; Epicureísmo; Mal; Hedonismo; Sensación; Privación

The present paper attempts to reconstruct and assess the main Epicurean arguments against the idea that death is an evil for the one who dies.In order to fight against the life anguished by the fear of death, Epicurus and Lucretius deploy a series of arguments aimed at showing the irrationality or the lack of justification of this fear. Although I share the thesis according to which an eudaimonic life entails the acceptance of our mortal nature, I suggest, however, that this does not force us to embrace the much more radical thesis according to which “death is nothing for us”. Particularly, the paper argues that the discussed arguments invalidate the fear of the fact itself of being dead, but not other fears related to the fact of not carrying on living.