Criminal Policy Considerations on The Offense of Conflict of Interest in The Public Sector: Reconstruing its Wrongness as Endangerment Against Government Decisions

• Autor: Rusca, Bruno
• Formato: artículo
• Fecha de Publicación: 2023
• Institución: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
• Repositorio: Revistas - Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
• Lenguaje: español
• OAI Identifier: oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/26893
• Enlace del recurso: http://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/derechopucp/article/view/26893
• Nivel de acceso: acceso abierto
• Materia: Prohibited negotiations to public officers; Crimes against Public Administration; Public corruption; Endangerment; Implicit biases; Criminal policy; Delito de negociaciones incompatibles; Delitos contra la Administración pública; Corrupción pública; Puesta en peligro; Sesgos implícitos; Política criminal

Based on the distinction drawn by R. A. Duff between attacks and endangerments as two different kind of wrongs, this paper advocates a view of the crime of conflict of interest in the public sector as implicit endangerment against government decisions. This view is supported by different empirical studies, which demonstrate that, in scenarios of conflict of interest, although agents do not act with a deliberate purpose of benefiting themselves, their decisions tend to privilege their private interests. In addition, it is argued that, according to the perspective defended, the scope of the offense should include interests and acts of a non-economic nature. It should be clarified that the purpose of this paper is to contribute to the development of a normative theory of negotiations incompatible with public office which determines how this crime should be regulated, regardless of the specific way in which each legislation defines such behavior.