David Hume on Materialism

• Autor: Calvente, Sofía
• Formato: artículo
• Fecha de Publicación: 2023
• Institución: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
• Repositorio: Revistas - Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
• Lenguaje: español
• OAI Identifier: oai:revistaspuc:article/27917
• Enlace del recurso: http://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/arete/article/view/27917
• Nivel de acceso: acceso abierto
• Materia: Mind; Matter; Substantialist metaphysics; Causality; Analogy with nature; Mente; Materia; Metafísica sustancialista; Causalidad; Analogía con la naturaleza

During the 17th and 18th centuries, an intense debate concerning materialism took place. This paper aims to describe David Hume’s position within this debate. I claim that, even though Hume rejects substantialist metaphysics to focus on the study of perceptions, he defends a position concerning the relationship between mind and matter. However, this position is rather complex to reconstruct since it is not explicitly stated in the texts edited during Hume’s life. I propose to define it as a restricted materialism since, regarding the nature of mind, Hume discards both the materialist and the immaterialist positions; although concerning the causes of thought he comes close to materialist positions by using arguments based on experience and the analogy with nature.