The Future of Feminist Liberalism

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Feminists have sometimes argued that philosophical theories of justice deriving from the liberal tradition cannot deal adequately with the concerns of women. I argue that in many ways this contention is mistaken: the best liberal theories of justice provide a very strong basis for thinking about wha...

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Autor: Nussbaum, Martha
Formato: artículo
Fecha de Publicación:2001
Institución:Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
Repositorio:Revistas - Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
Lenguaje:español
OAI Identifier:oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/7427
Enlace del recurso:http://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/arete/article/view/7427
Nivel de acceso:acceso abierto
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spelling The Future of Feminist LiberalismEl futuro del liberalismo feministaNussbaum, MarthaFeminists have sometimes argued that philosophical theories of justice deriving from the liberal tradition cannot deal adequately with the concerns of women. I argue that in many ways this contention is mistaken: the best liberal theories of justice provide a very strong basis for thinking about what respect for human dignity requires. There are, however, two areas pertinent to sex equality in which even the strongest liberal theories have grave difficulty. First is the area of need and dependency. All theories of justice and morality deriving from the European social contract tradition fail to build into the basic social structure concern for care in times of asymmetrical dependency. The second problem I investigate is the problem of just distribution within the family. Focusing on the theory of John Rawls, I argue that his liberal commitment to seeing the family as a sphere of protected personal choice is in tension with his admission that the family is part of the "basic structure" of society. Moreover, the family does not exist by nature: it is always a construct of state action. The state should therefore make sure that this constructing is done well, compatibly with justice for women and children.Los feministas han sostenido algunas veces que las teorías filosóficas de la justicia que provienen de la tradición liberal no pueden tratar adecuadamente las preocupaciones de las mujeres. Yo sostengo que de muchas maneras este argumento está errado: las mejores teorías liberales de la justicia proporcionan una base muy fuerte para pensar acerca de lo que requiere el respeto por la dignidad humana. Sin embargo, hay dos áreas pertinentes a la igualdad sexual en las cuales incluso las teorías liberales más fuertes hallan graves dificultades. La primera es el área de la necesidad y la dependencia. Ninguna de las teorías de la justicia y la moralidad que provienen de la tradición europea del contrato social logra introducir en la estructura social básica la preocupación por el cuidado en tiempos de dependencia asimétrica. El segundo problema que investigo es aquél de la distribución justa al interior de la familia. Centrándome en la teoría de John Rawls, sostengo que suc ompromiso liberal de ver a la familia como una esfera de elección personal protegida se halla en tensión con su afirmación de que la familia es parte de la "estructura básica" de la sociedad. Asimismo, la familia no existe por naturaleza, es siempre algo construido por la acción estatal. El Estado debería, por ende, asegurar que esta construcción se haga bien, de modo compatible con la justicia para mujeres y niños.Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades2001-09-03info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttp://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/arete/article/view/7427Areté; Vol. 13 Núm. 1 (2001); 59-1012223-37411016-913Xreponame:Revistas - Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perúinstname:Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perúinstacron:PUCPspahttp://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/arete/article/view/7427/7649Derechos de autor 2016 Aretéhttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/74272020-09-02T16:40:45Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The Future of Feminist Liberalism
El futuro del liberalismo feminista
title The Future of Feminist Liberalism
spellingShingle The Future of Feminist Liberalism
Nussbaum, Martha
title_short The Future of Feminist Liberalism
title_full The Future of Feminist Liberalism
title_fullStr The Future of Feminist Liberalism
title_full_unstemmed The Future of Feminist Liberalism
title_sort The Future of Feminist Liberalism
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Nussbaum, Martha
author Nussbaum, Martha
author_facet Nussbaum, Martha
author_role author
description Feminists have sometimes argued that philosophical theories of justice deriving from the liberal tradition cannot deal adequately with the concerns of women. I argue that in many ways this contention is mistaken: the best liberal theories of justice provide a very strong basis for thinking about what respect for human dignity requires. There are, however, two areas pertinent to sex equality in which even the strongest liberal theories have grave difficulty. First is the area of need and dependency. All theories of justice and morality deriving from the European social contract tradition fail to build into the basic social structure concern for care in times of asymmetrical dependency. The second problem I investigate is the problem of just distribution within the family. Focusing on the theory of John Rawls, I argue that his liberal commitment to seeing the family as a sphere of protected personal choice is in tension with his admission that the family is part of the "basic structure" of society. Moreover, the family does not exist by nature: it is always a construct of state action. The state should therefore make sure that this constructing is done well, compatibly with justice for women and children.
publishDate 2001
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2001-09-03
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
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dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/arete/article/view/7427
url http://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/arete/article/view/7427
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language spa
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv http://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/arete/article/view/7427/7649
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv Derechos de autor 2016 Areté
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Derechos de autor 2016 Areté
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eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Areté; Vol. 13 Núm. 1 (2001); 59-101
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