Between Rupture and Continuity: From Exegesis to Free Scientific Enquiry, Through Raymond Saleilles

• Autor: Torres Rodríguez, Oscar Enrique
• Formato: artículo
• Fecha de Publicación: 2026
• Institución: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
• Repositorio: Revistas - Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
• Lenguaje: español
• OAI Identifier: oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/31619
• Enlace del recurso: http://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/derechopucp/article/view/31619
• Nivel de acceso: acceso abierto
• Materia: Exegesis; Free scientific research; Legiscentrism; François Gény; Raymond Saleilles; Exégesis; Libre investigación científica; Legiscentrismo

This paper examines the doctrinal transformations in theinterpretation of law in France. It starts with the rise of the Exegesis and the subsequent apparition of the Free Scientific Research movement, leaded by François Gény and Raymond Saleilles. Exegesis, which developed after the promulgation of Napoleon’s Code civil, was the official method of legal interpretations throughout the 19th century. It was grounded in a formalist and statist vision of the Civil Code, viewed as a logical, complete, clear and self-sufficient system. This approach advocated a declarative interpretation of legal texts, focused on uncovering the evident meaning of the law and the legislator’s intent, while considerably limiting judicial discretion. By the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the limitations of the exegetical model became evident due to social and legal changes. In response, the Free Scientific Research movement introduced a new approach to legal interpretation, incorporating extra-legal element such as social facts, the demands of justice and comparative law. Although this movement strongly criticized the excesses of the exegetical method, this article argues that Gény and Saleilles did not completely break away from Exegesis; rather, they retained several of its principles, particularly the respect for the supremacy of written law. Through a comparative analysis of both movements of though, this study demonstrates that the relationship between Exegesis and Free Scientific Research should not be understood as one of radical opposition—as suggested by Chaïm Perelman and Julien Bonnecase—, but rather as a partial transition marked by continuity. This perspective allows us to reassess transformations in contemporary legal thought and suggests that doctrinal evolution has been shaped by a dialectic tension rather than a radical rupture, combining fidelity to written legal texts and openness to social realities.