Essays on Antisocial Preferences, Altruism, and Information Transmission

• Autor: Zevallos Porles, Victoria Graciela
• Formato: tesis doctoral
• Fecha de Publicación: 2018
• Institución: Superintendencia Nacional de Educación Superior Universitaria
• Repositorio: Registro Nacional de Trabajos conducentes a Grados y Títulos - RENATI
• Lenguaje: inglés
• OAI Identifier: oai:renati.sunedu.gob.pe:renati/6984
• Enlace del recurso: https://renati.sunedu.gob.pe/handle/sunedu/3459870; https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/67697
• Nivel de acceso: acceso abierto
• Materia: Teoría de juegos; Altruismo; Información asimétrica; Conducta antisocial; https://purl.org/pe-repo/ocde/ford#5.02.01

This doctoral thesis consists of a collection of three independent chapters. The first chapter reports the results of a laboratory experiment designed to investigate whether antisocial behaviour is driven by nastiness, defined as an intrinsic pleasure derived from lowering the well-being of others. As we shall see, people are not nasty for the sake of being nasty. Rather, people become nastier when lowering somebody’s welfare is monetarily beneficial. The second chapter explores the effects of the relative price and monetary stakes on the Dictators’ decisions in three different contexts. The data shows the experimental context matter: the effect of the monetary stakes is strong and significant on giving, but is weak and insignificant on taking. The third chapter presents an experiment designed to investigate the role of ex-post acquisition information in Sender-Receiver games. The analysis reveals that deception decreases when the Receiver can learn about the structure of the payoffs. Furthermore, a significant minority of Receivers choose to get ex post information about the payoffs.