On Collusion and Industry Size

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In this paper we investigate the connection between the number of competitors and the sustainability of collusion within the context of a infinitely repeated symmetric Cournot model where only a subset of firms cooperate. We show that, in our model, an increase in the number of cartel firms may incr...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Escrihuela-Villar, Marc, Guillén, Jorge
Formato: artículo
Fecha de Publicación:2011
Institución:Universidad ESAN
Repositorio:ESAN-Institucional
Lenguaje:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:repositorio.esan.edu.pe:20.500.12640/3407
Enlace del recurso:https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12640/3407
Nivel de acceso:acceso abierto
Materia:Collusion
Sustainability
Fringe
Colusión
Sostenibilidad
Margen
https://purl.org/pe-repo/ocde/ford#5.02.04
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spelling Escrihuela-Villar, MarcGuillén, Jorge2023-06-15T18:58:40Z2023-06-15T18:58:40Z2011Escrihuela-Villar, M., & Guillén, J. (2011). On collusion and industry size. Annals of Economics and Finance, 12(1), 31-40.https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12640/3407In this paper we investigate the connection between the number of competitors and the sustainability of collusion within the context of a infinitely repeated symmetric Cournot model where only a subset of firms cooperate. We show that, in our model, an increase in the number of cartel firms may increase collusion likelihood by diminishing the negative effects for collusion of the existence of a competitive fringe. Also, we show that an increase in the number of fringe firms makes collusion harder to sustain.application/pdfInglésengCEMA, Central University of Finance and EconomicsCNurn:issn:1529-7373https://down.aefweb.net/AefArticles/aef120103.pdfinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internationalhttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/CollusionSustainabilityFringeColusiónSostenibilidadMargenhttps://purl.org/pe-repo/ocde/ford#5.02.04On Collusion and Industry Sizeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionArtículoreponame:ESAN-Institucionalinstname:Universidad ESANinstacron:ESANhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-4511-2108Acceso abiertoAnnals of Economics and Finance4013112ORIGINALguillen_2011.pdfguillen_2011.pdfTexto completoapplication/pdf295573https://repositorio.esan.edu.pe/bitstreams/7db09dde-c912-482b-830e-e33a666a045a/downloadae13eba25cd1c638f386e97771dd7d92MD51trueAnonymousREADTHUMBNAILguillen_2011.pdf.jpgguillen_2011.pdf.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg3090https://repositorio.esan.edu.pe/bitstreams/1454c4e4-9115-48dd-9f44-8c19c1036e65/downloadc2f66c4c422d2d9e78b989db3f73ab80MD55falseAnonymousREADTEXTguillen_2011.pdf.txtguillen_2011.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain25622https://repositorio.esan.edu.pe/bitstreams/5c4e398a-40b4-47c4-9671-dfdb727d0910/downloadc780f462e7d18ef885b971ac89c60a5aMD54falseAnonymousREAD20.500.12640/3407oai:repositorio.esan.edu.pe:20.500.12640/34072024-11-25 19:41:24.275https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessopen.accesshttps://repositorio.esan.edu.peRepositorio Institucional ESANrepositorio@esan.edu.pe
dc.title.en_EN.fl_str_mv On Collusion and Industry Size
title On Collusion and Industry Size
spellingShingle On Collusion and Industry Size
Escrihuela-Villar, Marc
Collusion
Sustainability
Fringe
Colusión
Sostenibilidad
Margen
https://purl.org/pe-repo/ocde/ford#5.02.04
title_short On Collusion and Industry Size
title_full On Collusion and Industry Size
title_fullStr On Collusion and Industry Size
title_full_unstemmed On Collusion and Industry Size
title_sort On Collusion and Industry Size
author Escrihuela-Villar, Marc
author_facet Escrihuela-Villar, Marc
Guillén, Jorge
author_role author
author2 Guillén, Jorge
author2_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Escrihuela-Villar, Marc
Guillén, Jorge
dc.subject.en_EN.fl_str_mv Collusion
Sustainability
Fringe
topic Collusion
Sustainability
Fringe
Colusión
Sostenibilidad
Margen
https://purl.org/pe-repo/ocde/ford#5.02.04
dc.subject.es_ES.fl_str_mv Colusión
Sostenibilidad
Margen
dc.subject.ocde.none.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/pe-repo/ocde/ford#5.02.04
description In this paper we investigate the connection between the number of competitors and the sustainability of collusion within the context of a infinitely repeated symmetric Cournot model where only a subset of firms cooperate. We show that, in our model, an increase in the number of cartel firms may increase collusion likelihood by diminishing the negative effects for collusion of the existence of a competitive fringe. Also, we show that an increase in the number of fringe firms makes collusion harder to sustain.
publishDate 2011
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2023-06-15T18:58:40Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2023-06-15T18:58:40Z
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv 2011
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
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format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.citation.none.fl_str_mv Escrihuela-Villar, M., & Guillén, J. (2011). On collusion and industry size. Annals of Economics and Finance, 12(1), 31-40.
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12640/3407
identifier_str_mv Escrihuela-Villar, M., & Guillén, J. (2011). On collusion and industry size. Annals of Economics and Finance, 12(1), 31-40.
url https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12640/3407
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv eng
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
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eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
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https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv CEMA, Central University of Finance and Economics
dc.publisher.country.none.fl_str_mv CN
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On Collusion and Industry Size
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