In order to separate from an excessively idealistic reading of Husserl’s phenomenology, Sartre turned to Heidegger’s ontology. His main goal was then to establish a phenomenological ontology. However, the author argues that all the main concepts that Sartre found in Heidegger, that is, nothingness, anguish, death and finitude, are constantly redefined into the French philosopher’s philosophy. This gesture explains the rupture according to which when Heidegger’s philosophy is a philosophy of finitude and death, that of Sartre is a philosophy and life.

Among all the fields covered by Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology of givenness, it is remarkable that politics occupies a scarce, if not non-existent, place. This quasi-absence can be explained by conceptual reasons, given that political philosophy is enclosed within metaphysics through its recurrent use of concepts such as the subject, the power or the interests. However, it is possible to think, from Marion’s philosophy, a politics that is not limited to his metaphysical figure. This possibility supposes a true politics of communion that unites the collective from a point that remains external to it and that does not serve as its foundation.

In order to separate from an excessively idealistic reading of Husserl’s phenomenology, Sartre turned to Heidegger’s ontology. His main goal was then to establish a phenomenological ontology. However, the author argues that all the main concepts that Sartre found in Heidegger, that is, nothingness, anguish, death and finitude, are constantly redefined into the French philosopher’s philosophy. This gesture explains the rupture according to which when Heidegger’s philosophy is a philosophy of finitude and death, that of Sartre is a philosophy and life.

Among all the fields covered by Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology of givenness, it is remarkable that politics occupies a scarce, if not non-existent, place. This quasi-absence can be explained by conceptual reasons, given that political philosophy is enclosed within metaphysics through its recurrent use of concepts such as the subject, the power or the interests. However, it is possible to think, from Marion’s philosophy, a politics that is not limited to his metaphysical figure. This possibility supposes a true politics of communion that unites the collective from a point that remains external to it and that does not serve as its foundation.

In order to separate from an excessively idealistic reading of Husserl’s phenomenology, Sartre turned to Heidegger’s ontology. His main goal was then to establish a phenomenological ontology. However, the author argues that all the main concepts that Sartre found in Heidegger, that is, nothingness, anguish, death and finitude, are constantly redefined into the French philosopher’s philosophy. This gesture explains the rupture according to which when Heidegger’s philosophy is a philosophy of finitude and death, that of Sartre is a philosophy and life.

Among all the fields covered by Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology of givenness, it is remarkable that politics occupies a scarce, if not non-existent, place. This quasi-absence can be explained by conceptual reasons, given that political philosophy is enclosed within metaphysics through its recurrent use of concepts such as the subject, the power or the interests. However, it is possible to think, from Marion’s philosophy, a politics that is not limited to his metaphysical figure. This possibility supposes a true politics of communion that unites the collective from a point that remains external to it and that does not serve as its foundation.