Important theories about the attribution of mental contents and/or linguisticmeanings propose a theoretical characterization about mental and linguisticunderstanding. As one of the consequences of this, they cannot account forinstances of genuine conceptual diversity: the exotic expressions and their conceptual repertoires must be re-describe by means of a theory, articulated in our conceptual repertoire, that eliminates that diversity. Wittgenstein, on the other side, has argued that understanding of the linguistic and non linguistic behavior of other creatures is based on primitive ways of reciprocal understanding, settled on practical agreements. Consequently, he has characterized our relationship towards radically estrange behaviors as a form of “instinctive uncertainty”. On these bases, I will attempt to show how it is possible to dissolve skeptical problems and elude contrived ...

Importantes teorías acerca de la atribución de contenidos mentales y/o de significados lingüísticos proponen una caracterización teoricista acerca de la comprensión mental y lingüística. Entre sus efectos, no pueden dar cuenta de casos de genuina diversidad conceptual: las expresiones exóticas y sus repertorios conceptuales tienen que ser re-descritas por medio de una teoría, expuesta en nuestro propio repertorio conceptual, que elimine esa diversidad. Wittgenstein, por su parte, ha argumentado que la comprensión de la conducta lingüística y no lingüística de otras criaturas se asienta en modalidades primitivas de comprensión recíproca, basadas a su vez en concordancias de orden práctico. Consecuentemente, ha caracterizado nuestra relación con comportamientos radicalmente extraños como una forma de “incertidumbre instintiva”. En este trabajo intentaré mostrar có...

Important theories about the attribution of mental contents and/or linguisticmeanings propose a theoretical characterization about mental and linguisticunderstanding. As one of the consequences of this, they cannot account forinstances of genuine conceptual diversity: the exotic expressions and their conceptual repertoires must be re-describe by means of a theory, articulated in our conceptual repertoire, that eliminates that diversity. Wittgenstein, on the other side, has argued that understanding of the linguistic and non linguistic behavior of other creatures is based on primitive ways of reciprocal understanding, settled on practical agreements. Consequently, he has characterized our relationship towards radically estrange behaviors as a form of “instinctive uncertainty”. On these bases, I will attempt to show how it is possible to dissolve skeptical problems and elude contrived ...