Under anarchy, uncoordinated competitive theft by "roving bandits" destroys the incentive to invest and produce, leaving little to be gamed by either the population or the bandits. Both would be better off if a bandit sets himself up as a dictator -a "stationary bandit" who monopolizes and rationalizes that theft in the form of taxes-. A secure autocrat has an encompassing interest in his domain that leads him to provide a peaceful order and other public goods that increase productivity. Whenever an autocrat expects a brief tenure, it pays him to confiscate those assets whose tax yield over his tenure is less than their total value. The incentive plus the inherent uncertainty of succession in dictatorships imply that autocracies rarely perform well economically for more than a generation. The conditions necessary for a lasting democracy are the same that are needed for the security of pr...

The supply of collective goods requires a state that is capable of managing large-scale organizations, a feature that is particularly scarce in underdeveloped countries. We should not, then, be surprised In¡ the fact that government regulations and public services work less well in developing than in developed countries. Whatever the optimal role of government may be in developed countries, it will be smaller in developing countries until they learn to deal with large-scale organizations in an efficient way.

Under anarchy, uncoordinated competitive theft by “roving bandits“ destroys the incentive to invest and produce, leaving little to be gamed by either the population or the bandits. Both would be better off if a bandit sets himself up as a dictator -a “stationary bandit“ who monopolizes and rationalizes that theft in the form of taxes-. A secure autocrat has an encompassing interest in his domain that leads him to provide a peaceful order and other public goods that increase productivity. Whenever an autocrat expects a brief tenure, it pays him to confiscate those assets whose tax yield over his tenure is less than their total value. The incentive plus the inherent uncertainty of succession in dictatorships imply that autocracies rarely perform well economically for more than a generation. The conditions necessary for a lasting democracy are the same that are needed for the securi...

El aprovisionamiento de bienes colectivos requiere de un Estado que sepa manejar organizaciones de gran escala, pero esta tecnología organizacional es particularmente escasa en los países pobres. No debe sorprendernos, por lo tanto, que las regulaciones estatales y los servicios públicos no funcionen tan bien en los países subdesarrollados como en los industrializados. Por importante que sea el aparato estatal en los países desarrollados, es obvio que su tamaño óptimo va a ser menor en los subdesarrollados, al menos hasta que sus gobiernos aprendan a operar eficientemente las organizaciones de gran tamaño.