La tesis endogeniza la elección entre despidos temporales y permanentes ya que estos últimos son importantes empíricamente . El modelo explica varias de las regularidades de las series de tiempo de creación y destrucción de empleo y desempleo

We study the role of an enforcer in the e§ectiveness of selective incentives in solving the collective action problem when groups take part in a contest. Cost functions exhibit constant elasticity of marginal e§ort costs. If prize valuations are homogeneous, our source of heterogeneity induces full costsharing and the Örst-best individual contributions; further, the group probability of winning goes up. With heterogeneity in prize valuations, an increase in the e§ectiveness of the enforcer in conáict increases the group probability of winning only if the prize valuation of the enforcer is lower than de Lehmer mean of those of the other players; however, the induced partial cost sharing is not group e¢ cient. If e§ectiveness "tends to inÖnity", the collective action problem is solved with partial cost-sharing if that prize valuation is not too low. Tragically, if productivity is l...