En la filosofía social contemporánea el concepto de reconocimiento está en discusión. Por un lado, algunos filósofos, entre los que destacan Louis Althusser, Michel Foucault y Judith Butler, sostienen que el reconocimiento significa la adhesión subjetiva al poder expresada en la respuesta al llamado de la ley. En esta respuesta la subjetividad se reconoce en la ley, adquiriendo una identidad práctica. Por esto, para estos filósofos el reconocimiento es la forma por la cual el sujeto queda sujetado a la ley. Por otro lado, Axel Honneth sostiene que el reconocimiento es el movimiento dialéctico en el que la subjetividad busca afirmarse en el otro para ampliar el horizonte valorativo de la sociedad. La estructura normativa que puede satisfacer el deseo de afirmación subjetiva es la autorrestricción del egocentrismo por respeto al otro. De este modo es posible estar con consigo mi...

En la filosofía social contemporánea el concepto de reconocimiento está en discusión. Por un lado, algunos filósofos, entre los que destacan Louis Althusser, Michel Foucault y Judith Butler, sostienen que el reconocimiento significa la adhesión subjetiva al poder expresada en la respuesta al llamado de la ley. En esta respuesta la subjetividad se reconoce en la ley, adquiriendo una identidad práctica. Por esto, para estos filósofos el reconocimiento es la forma por la cual el sujeto queda sujetado a la ley. Por otro lado, Axel Honneth sostiene que el reconocimiento es el movimiento dialéctico en el que la subjetividad busca afirmarse en el otro para ampliar el horizonte valorativo de la sociedad. La estructura normativa que puede satisfacer el deseo de afirmación subjetiva es la autorrestricción del egocentrismo por respeto al otro. De este modo es posible estar con consigo mi...

The present article problematizes the notion of recognition in the thought of Axel Honneth, confronting it against the theory of ideology of Louis Althusser. If the struggle for recognition is the consequence of moral wrongs, the vindication of the values denied to the aggrieved is the objective. However, recognition posed in this way implies recognizing and subjecting the subject within a hegemonic value order. Only then, we can question whether the rupture or the reproduction of the ideological order indicates the limit of the critical potential of Honneth’s recognition theory. This article tries to answer this question.

This article seeks to understand the role that religion plays in Hegel, specially, in his work Phenomenology of the Spirit, taking the concept of recognition as the hermeneutical key of the Hegelian work. For this, we first historically locate the appearance and reception of the concept of recognition in German Idealism. Then, we present the structure of reconciliation relationships between subject and object that Phenomenology supposes. We conclude by highlighting the role that religion has as a category of self-awareness in the structure of recognition relationships inmodern society.

Between the end of the nineteenth century and first decades of twentieth century, the Peruvian intelligentsia discussed what State the Peruvian society required. The question was faced with the help of the modern social sciences like sociology and scientific history. However, the building of Nation-State required a view of the society like totality. This means a history about the past, the present and future. José Carlos Mariátegui made a modern narrative about the Peruvian Nation-State disagreeing with consolidated narrative, i.e. positivist narrative and spiritualist narrative. Mariátegui’s narrative was articulated by two principles or central concepts: myth and indio. These concepts together with a Marxist framework built the modern narrative of Peruvian society and the revolutionary subject of Peruvian history.

Marx’s critique of political economy consists of a critique of alienation. The purpose of this article is to argue the existence of a materialist connection between alienation and ideology in Marx. The study engages with Louis Althusser’s influential thesis, which suggests that the concept of alienation is ideological, as it is based on an idealist notion of subjectivity opposed to the material relations of production. However, Marx does not discard the concept; instead, he transforms it in a materialist sense, conceiving of the subject in relation to the object. Unlike the consciousness-based philosophies of Hegel and Feuerbach, Marxist alienation is defined as the privation of the producer from the objective and material links to the means, conditions, and product of their labor. This material dispossession prevents the subject’s realization and results in the worker being reduce...

The present article problematizes the notion of recognition in the thought of Axel Honneth, confronting it against the theory of ideology of Louis Althusser. If the struggle for recognition is the consequence of moral wrongs, the vindication of the values denied to the aggrieved is the objective. However, recognition posed in this way implies recognizing and subjecting the subject within a hegemonic value order. Only then, we can question whether the rupture or the reproduction of the ideological order indicates the limit of the critical potential of Honneth’s recognition theory. This article tries to answer this question.

This article seeks to understand the role that religion plays in Hegel, specially, in his work Phenomenology of the Spirit, taking the concept of recognition as the hermeneutical key of the Hegelian work. For this, we first historically locate the appearance and reception of the concept of recognition in German Idealism. Then, we present the structure of reconciliation relationships between subject and object that Phenomenology supposes. We conclude by highlighting the role that religion has as a category of self-awareness in the structure of recognition relationships inmodern society.