This paper questions the use of the “form/substance” pair in Coseriu’s essay Form and Substance in Language Sounds, from the hermeneutic phenomenological method. I argue that, from a hermeneutic phenomenological point of view, the main argument of Coseriu's contribution makes it unnecessary to recognize the dual ontological dimension of language (nature and mind) that the author maintains in his exposition. I will defend that neither the operability of the pair nor the dual aspect it leads to are consistent, justifying why the use of the pair should be abandoned, the conception of the dual ontological nature of language rejected, and showing the potential that a properly understood method holds for theoretical linguistics and the history of linguistics.

This paper discusses the grounding of the possibility of a critique of general linguistics or linguistic theory based on an interpretation of a passage of Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism. According to my interpretation, the metaphysical conception of language generates an obliteration that does not allow to understand the phenomenon of language or languages. However, I claim that such a conception and, therefore, the obliteration itself are part of the phenomenon of language and not something external that can be avoided. Therefore, I raise the question if linguistics supports such a conception and defend that the obliteration diagnosed by Heidegger requires a discrimination of the fundamental concepts of linguistics and its presuppositions. I suggest as a work hypothesis in the context of critical practice that it is not linguistics itself that supports this conception –such as ...

This paper questions the use of the “form/substance” pair in Coseriu’s essay Form and Substance in Language Sounds, from the hermeneutic phenomenological method. I argue that, from a hermeneutic phenomenological point of view, the main argument of Coseriu's contribution makes it unnecessary to recognize the dual ontological dimension of language (nature and mind) that the author maintains in his exposition. I will defend that neither the operability of the pair nor the dual aspect it leads to are consistent, justifying why the use of the pair should be abandoned, the conception of the dual ontological nature of language rejected, and showing the potential that a properly understood method holds for theoretical linguistics and the history of linguistics.

This paper questions the use of the “form/substance” pair in Coseriu’s essay Form and Substance in Language Sounds, from the hermeneutic phenomenological method. I argue that, from a hermeneutic phenomenological point of view, the main argument of Coseriu's contribution makes it unnecessary to recognize the dual ontological dimension of language (nature and mind) that the author maintains in his exposition. I will defend that neither the operability of the pair nor the dual aspect it leads to are consistent, justifying why the use of the pair should be abandoned, the conception of the dual ontological nature of language rejected, and showing the potential that a properly understood method holds for theoretical linguistics and the history of linguistics.

This paper discusses the grounding of the possibility of a critique of general linguistics or linguistic theory based on an interpretation of a passage of Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism. According to my interpretation, the metaphysical conception of language generates an obliteration that does not allow to understand the phenomenon of language or languages. However, I claim that such a conception and, therefore, the obliteration itself are part of the phenomenon of language and not something external that can be avoided. Therefore, I raise the question if linguistics supports such a conception and defend that the obliteration diagnosed by Heidegger requires a discrimination of the fundamental concepts of linguistics and its presuppositions. I suggest as a work hypothesis in the context of critical practice that it is not linguistics itself that supports this conception – such as it i...

This paper discusses the grounding of the possibility of a critique of general linguistics or linguistic theory based on an interpretation of a passage of Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism. According to my interpretation, the metaphysical conception of language generates an obliteration that does not allow to understand the phenomenon of language or languages. However, I claim that such a conception and, therefore, the obliteration itself are part of the phenomenon of language and not something external that can be avoided. Therefore, I raise the question if linguistics supports such a conception and defend that the obliteration diagnosed by Heidegger requires a discrimination of the fundamental concepts of linguistics and its presuppositions. I suggest as a work hypothesis in the context of critical practice that it is not linguistics itself that supports this conception –such as ...