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This paper presents the debate between Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend (close friends and also, disciples of Karl Popper) about the foundations of scientific method. First, as a sort of introduction, it presents Popper’s deductivist position, known as falsification, which states the ability of scientific theories to submit to falsation through a critical approach to its own basic conceptions. Then, Lakatos’ epistemological stance, known as the Methodology of Research Programs, is explained as a sophisticated version of falsification that started in a naïve fashion with Popper. In the last two sections, the author analyzes Feyerabend’s position – which he himself baptized Methodological anarchism – whose main thesis is that any method is potentially valid in the set of discussions about the methodological and conceptual foundations of sc...

In Nietzsche’s early works, the concatenation of the small essay On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense, his second Untimely Meditaion: On the Use and Abuse of History for Life and his book Human, all too Human, we can witness the sustained quickness in the evolution of the Nietzschean conception of truth as a metaphorical construct. Its validation rests on its practical dimension as life-affirming action and contemplation, and so, philosophy is declared as a labor of clarification of how living and thinking life are the same thing. Besides, this path of thought brings out the statement of our historical background as an essential item for our understanding of how we have come to be what we are… and of course, that previously mentioned historical background is a construct.

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This paper presents the debate between Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend (close friends and also, disciples of Karl Popper) about the foundations of scientific method. First, as a sort of introduction, it presents Popper’s deductivist position, known as falsification, which states the ability of scientific theories to submit to falsation through a critical approach to its own basic conceptions. Then, Lakatos’ epistemological stance, known as the Methodology of Research Programs, is explained as a sophisticated version of falsification that started in a naïve fashion with Popper. In the last two sections, the author analyzes Feyerabend’s position – which he himself baptized Methodological anarchism – whose main thesis is that any method is potentially valid in the set of discussions about the methodological and conceptual foundations of sc...

In Nietzsche’s early works, the concatenation of the small essay On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense, his second Untimely Meditaion: On the Use and Abuse of History for Life and his book Human, all too Human, we can witness the sustained quickness in the evolution of the Nietzschean conception of truth as a metaphorical construct. Its validation rests on its practical dimension as life-affirming action and contemplation, and so, philosophy is declared as a labor of clarification of how living and thinking life are the same thing. Besides, this path of thought brings out the statement of our historical background as an essential item for our understanding of how we have come to be what we are… and of course, that previously mentioned historical background is a construct.