Esta tesis se plantea detectar riesgos de corrupción en las contrataciones públicas de la Policía Nacional del Perú (PNP) a partir de un conjunto de indicadores basados en observaciones directas (datos). La corrupción es el principal problema del país, donde las contrataciones irregulares han ido preocupantemente en aumento, y la policía no está exenta de ella. Por ello, se propone un modelo para detectar riesgos de corrupción en las contrataciones de la PNP, definida como una posible colusión entre las partes para favorecer a un solo proveedor mediante un proceso sin competencia (output), en función a cuatro indicadores, o alertas tempranas del posible fraude (inputs): 1) Tipo de procedimiento, 2) Tiempo de presentación de propuestas, 3) Tiempo de elección del postor ganador, y 4) Aumento del valor del contrato respecto al precio inicial. Para comprobar la posibilidad de so...

Currently, Odebrecht is the most emblematic case of corruption in Latin America, involving dozens of politicians, businessmen and public works, including Peru and Mexico. However, the problem is not only about corruption, but it is behind a little known system, where the concern has to do with the "rules of the game" and their "players". Therefore, this article aims to explain why Odebrecht was able to influence Peruvian and Mexican states’ decisions about awarding public contracts. In that line, it is argued that they were for three reasons. First, their timely delivery was attractive to politicians, because they were effective in finishing the works before they finished their term; and, therefore, they can inaugurate them with an additional incentive ("good side of the company"). Second, another factor was its influence on the State, because they created a corruption net with the hig...

Esta tesis se plantea detectar riesgos de corrupción en las contrataciones públicas de la Policía Nacional del Perú (PNP) a partir de un conjunto de indicadores basados en observaciones directas (datos). La corrupción es el principal problema del país, donde las contrataciones irregulares han ido preocupantemente en aumento, y la policía no está exenta de ella. Por ello, se propone un modelo para detectar riesgos de corrupción en las contrataciones de la PNP, definida como una posible colusión entre las partes para favorecer a un solo proveedor mediante un proceso sin competencia (output), en función a cuatro indicadores, o alertas tempranas del posible fraude (inputs): 1) Tipo de procedimiento, 2) Tiempo de presentación de propuestas, 3) Tiempo de elección del postor ganador, y 4) Aumento del valor del contrato respecto al precio inicial. Para comprobar la posibilidad de so...

Currently, Odebrecht is the most emblematic case of corruption in Latin America, involving dozens of politicians, businessmen and public works, including Peru and Mexico. However, the problem is not only about corruption, but it is behind a little known system, where the concern has to do with the "rules of the game" and their "players". Therefore, this article aims to explain why Odebrecht was able to influence Peruvian and Mexican states’ decisions about awarding public contracts. In that line, it is argued that they were for three reasons. First, their timely delivery was attractive to politicians, because they were effective in finishing the works before they finished their term; and, therefore, they can inaugurate them with an additional incentive ("good side of the company"). Second, another factor was its influence on the State, because they created a corruption net with the hig...

Currently, Odebrecht is the most emblematic case of corruption in Latin America, involving dozens of politicians, businessmen and public works, including Peru and Mexico. However, the problem is not only about corruption, but it is behind a little known system, where the concern has to do with the "rules of the game" and their "players". Therefore, this article aims to explain why Odebrecht was able to influence Peruvian and Mexican states’ decisions about awarding public contracts. In that line, it is argued that they were for three reasons. First, their timely delivery was attractive to politicians, because they were effective in finishing the works before they finished their term; and, therefore, they can inaugurate them with an additional incentive ("good side of the company"). Second, another factor was its influence on the State, because they created a corruption net with the hig...