The notoriety that criminal proceedings against Latin-American political figures have acquired led some to argue that such proceedings constitute a perverse attack against popular leaders who oppose the neoliberal agendas of the global north. Before this issue, in this article I intend to systematically reconstruct the specialized literature on the concept of lawfare. Then I will outline both mythical and fallacious nature of many of the explanations and implications for so-called lawfare. Since those criticisms, I will highlight two relevant topics: (i) the necessary respect for the basic procedural guarantees for any person who is accused of serious crimes against public administration, and (ii) the inevitable political dimension of legal interpretation.

The notoriety that criminal proceedings against Latin-American political figures have acquired led some to argue that such proceedings constitute a perverse attack against popular leaders who oppose the neoliberal agendas of the global north. Before this issue, in this article I intend to systematically reconstruct the specialized literature on the concept of lawfare. Then I will outline both mythical and fallacious nature of many of the explanations and implications for so-called lawfare. Since those criticisms, I will highlight two relevant topics: (i) the necessary respect for the basic procedural guarantees for any person who is accused of serious crimes against public administration, and (ii) the inevitable political dimension of legal interpretation.

The notoriety that criminal proceedings against Latin-American political figures have acquired led some to argue that such proceedings constitute a perverse attack against popular leaders who oppose the neoliberal agendas of the global north. Before this issue, in this article I intend to systematically reconstruct the specialized literature on the concept of lawfare. Then I will outline both mythical and fallacious nature of many of the explanations and implications for so-called lawfare. Since those criticisms, I will highlight two relevant topics: (i) the necessary respect for the basic procedural guarantees for any person who is accused of serious crimes against public administration, and (ii) the inevitable political dimension of legal interpretation.

This article aims to examine whether the so-called «right to lie» exists within the framework of the accusatory criminal procedures. Some defend this right as a necessary extension of the accused’s basic right not to self-incriminate; others, however, argue that the right to remain silent or not to actively cooperate with the prosecutor’s investigation does not imply the possibility of telling lies. Thus, once the accused decides to speak, they are bound to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Based on a review of the discussion among some of the most relevant thinkers who have addressed the issue of lying (for example, Kant, Constant and Augustine of Hippo), this paper will defend a conciliatory or eclectic claim on the right to lie. We will argue that the debate often turns blurred because moral and epistemic levels are confused when formulating a concept of...

This article aims to examine whether the so-called «right to lie» exists within the framework of the accusatory criminal procedures. Some defend this right as a necessary extension of the accused’s basic right not to self-incriminate; others, however, argue that the right to remain silent or not to actively cooperate with the prosecutor’s investigation does not imply the possibility of telling lies. Thus, once the accused decides to speak, they are bound to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Based on a review of the discussion among some of the most relevant thinkers who have addressed the issue of lying (for example, Kant, Constant and Augustine of Hippo), this paper will defend a conciliatory or eclectic claim on the right to lie. We will argue that the debate often turns blurred because moral and epistemic levels are confused when formulating a concept of...

This article aims to examine whether the so-called «right to lie» exists within the framework of the accusatory criminal procedures. Some defend this right as a necessary extension of the accused’s basic right not to self-incriminate; others, however, argue that the right to remain silent or not to actively cooperate with the prosecutor’s investigation does not imply the possibility of telling lies. Thus, once the accused decides to speak, they are bound to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Based on a review of the discussion among some of the most relevant thinkers who have addressed the issue of lying (for example, Kant, Constant and Augustine of Hippo), this paper will defend a conciliatory or eclectic claim on the right to lie. We will argue that the debate often turns blurred because moral and epistemic levels are confused when formulating a concept of...