The unpromising state of the colonial Peruvian economy, where prices were rising and productivity was at a standstill, led to a great slowdown in the tributary income of the Monarchy. In the face of this situation, the best solution to increase economic activity and swell the coffers of the Royal Tax Office was to hand over tax collection to Lima’s Consulado de Comercio. From the 1660s through the beginning of the eighteenth century, there was constant negotiation in Peru between the consigner, the Crown, and the consignees, the merchants.

Throughout the last third of the XVII century, the political and fiscal situation of the Audience of Lima district made it necessary for the Consejo de Indias to order the implementation of a visita process. The metropolitan authorities agreed to divide this task into two parts, one judicial and the other one related to the treasury, but the positive results didn’t occur at any time, not even in its beginning. Thus, in the absence of conclusions, that process was lengthened, passing from one inspector to another with identical performance, without procedural changes for its improvement. In this way, when the visita was concluded, the status of the institutions  ubject to the audit was hardly different from that detected at the beginning of the inspection.

The unpromising state of the colonial Peruvian economy, where prices were rising and productivity was at a standstill, led to a great slowdown in the tributary income of the Monarchy. In the face of this situation, the best solution to increase economic activity and swell the coffers of the Royal Tax Office was to hand over tax collection to Lima’s Consulado de Comercio. From the 1660s through the beginning of the eighteenth century, there was constant negotiation in Peru between the consigner, the Crown, and the consignees, the merchants.

A lo largo del último tercio del siglo XVII, la situación política y fiscal del distrito de la Audiencia de Lima hizo necesaria que el Consejo de Indias ordenase la puesta en marcha de un proceso de visita. Las autoridades metropolitanas acordaron la división de esta tarea en dos partes, una judicial y otra hacendística, pero los resultados positivos no se produjeron en ningún momento, ni tan siquiera en sus inicios. Así, ante la falta de conclusiones, el proceso se fue alargando, pasando de manos de unos visitadores a otros con idénticos rendimientos, sin que se produjesen modificaciones procesales para su mejora. De esta manera, cuando se dio por concluida la visita, el estado en que se encontraban las instituciones sujetas a la auditoría apenas se diferenciaba del detectado al inicio de la inspección.

The unpromising state of the colonial Peruvian economy, where prices were rising and productivity was at a standstill, led to a great slowdown in the tributary income of the Monarchy. In the face of this situation, the best solution to increase economic activity and swell the coffers of the Royal Tax Office was to hand over tax collection to Lima’s Consulado de Comercio. From the 1660s through the beginning of the eighteenth century, there was constant negotiation in Peru between the consigner, the Crown, and the consignees, the merchants.

Throughout the last third of the XVII century, the political and fiscal situation of the Audience of Lima district made it necessary for the Consejo de Indias to order the implementation of a visita process. The metropolitan authorities agreed to divide this task into two parts, one judicial and the other one related to the treasury, but the positive results didn’t occur at any time, not even in its beginning. Thus, in the absence of conclusions, that process was lengthened, passing from one inspector to another with identical performance, without procedural changes for its improvement. In this way, when the visita was concluded, the status of the institutions  ubject to the audit was hardly different from that detected at the beginning of the inspection.