From an eminently factual point of view, in almost all cases of public corruption there is a pact between public officials and private individuals in which public interests are subordinated to personal desires. However, paradoxically, in the crime of collusion, this pact is not sufficient to justify criminal intervention until it is carried out. This new interpretation of the crime has important consequences for key institutions of the theory of crime, such as the criminal risk to the legal interest the typical behavior or the system of criminal intervention. Thus, this work attempts to show the systematicity between the proposed interpretation and its legal consequences, hand in hand with basic questions of the theory of crime.

Organized crime can start within the State itself, even from its hierarchical and normative channels, in order to assure the effectiveness of their crimes. High corruption as a criminological category describes the synergy between political and economic power; thus, it obligates us to analyze the importance of the structural organization factor. Taking into account the current cases of political corruption that involve all Peruvian Presidents from the year 2000 onwards, we argue that the use of imputation criteria vastly used in doctrine, but no so much by our justice operators, could be a viable option that helps in the judgment of high officials at the apex of the Administration. Specifically, the application of the thesis of command responsibility for domain over organized power structures to high corruption cases.

From an eminently factual point of view, in almost all cases of public corruption there is a pact between public officials and private individuals, in which public interests are subordinated to personal desires. However, paradoxically, in the crime of collusion, this pact is not sufficient to justify criminal intervention until it is carried out. This new interpretation of the crime has important consequences for key institutions of the theory of crime, such as the criminal risk to the legal interest, the typical behavior or the system of criminal intervention. Thus, this work attempts to show the systematicity between the proposed interpretation and its legal consequences, hand in hand with basic questions of the theory of crime.

El presente artículo analiza, desde la criminología y de manera introductoria, la gran corrupción y la corrupción política, para luego proponer algunas medidas de prevención de la corrupción pública.

Organized crime can start within the State itself, even from its hierarchical and normative channels, in order to assure the effectiveness of their crimes. High corruption as a criminological category describes the synergy between political and economic power; thus, it obligates us to analyze the importance of the structural organization factor. Taking into account the current cases of political corruption that involve all Peruvian Presidents from the year 2000 onwards, we argue that the use of imputation criteria vastly used in doctrine, but no so much by our justice operators, could be a viable option that helps in the judgment of high officials at the apex of the Administration. Specifically, the application of the thesis of command responsibility for domain over organized power structures to high corruption cases.

Organized crime can start within the State itself, even from its hierarchical and normative channels, in order to assure the effectiveness of their crimes. High corruption as a criminological category describes the synergy between political and economic power; thus, it obligates us to analyze the importance of the structural organization factor. Taking into account the current cases of political corruption that involve all Peruvian Presidents from the year 2000 onwards, we argue that the use of imputation criteria vastly used in doctrine, but no so much by our justice operators, could be a viable option that helps in the judgment of high officials at the apex of the Administration. Specifically, the application of the thesis of command responsibility for domain over organized power structures to high corruption cases.

From an eminently factual point of view, in almost all cases of public corruption there is a pact between public officials and private individuals, in which public interests are subordinated to personal desires. However, paradoxically, in the crime of collusion, this pact is not sufficient to justify criminal intervention until it is carried out. This new interpretation of the crime has important consequences for key institutions of the theory of crime, such as the criminal risk to the legal interest, the typical behavior or the system of criminal intervention. Thus, this work attempts to show the systematicity between the proposed interpretation and its legal consequences, hand in hand with basic questions of the theory of crime.