Este artículo versa, entre otros aspectos, sobre las doctrinas de “inmunidad implícita” y “jurisdicción primaria” en EE.UU., las cuales limitan las facultades de las autoridades de competencia en sectores regulados, favoreciendo la especialidad técnica del regulador sectorial. La doctrina constitucional del “Estado Regulador” en México también favorece a la agencia reguladora con mayores conocimientos técnicos. Tanto en EE.UU. como en la Unión Europea, las normas aplicables a los insumos esenciales únicamente resultan aplicables a aquellos casos en que un monopolista controla un insumo esencial “aguas arriba” y ejerce su poder de mercado para desplazar a sus competidores en el mercado “aguas abajo”. Esta aproximación sirvió de base para las discusiones que derivaron en el texto de la Ley Federal de Competencia Económica en México. La Controversia Constitu...

Digital platforms are changing the world, from the way we communicate to the way we commercialize products and services. Antitrust regulators are facing new challenges as they review entirely new and unprecedented markets with particular rules and dynamics. In Mexico, both antitrust authorities (the Federal Economic Competition Commission and the Federal Institute of Telecommunications) have suggested different interpretations regarding a jurisdictional assessment for digital markets, to the extent that it has been necessary to involve Federal Courts. Particularities of multiple-sided markets, big data, indirect network effects, multi-homing and the different conception of market power in digital markets have required a new approximation by antitrust authorities, both regarding merger control and in the investigation and prosecution of anticompetitive behavior.

Digital platforms are changing the world, from the way we communicate to the way we commercialize products and services. Antitrust regulators are facing new challenges as they review entirely new and unprecedented markets with particular rules and dynamics. In Mexico, both antitrust authorities (the Federal Economic Competition Commission and the Federal Institute of Telecommunications) have suggested different interpretations regarding a jurisdictional assessment for digital markets, to the extent that it has been necessary to involve Federal Courts. Particularities of multiple-sided markets, big data, indirect network effects, multi-homing and the different conception of market power in digital markets have required a new approximation by antitrust authorities, both regarding merger control and in the investigation and prosecution of anticompetitive behavior.

Digital platforms are changing the world, from the way we communicate to the way we commercialize products and services. Antitrust regulators are facing new challenges as they review entirely new and unprecedented markets with particular rules and dynamics. In Mexico, both antitrust authorities (the Federal Economic Competition Commission and the Federal Institute of Telecommunications) have suggested different interpretations regarding a jurisdictional assessment for digital markets, to the extent that it has been necessary to involve Federal Courts. Particularities of multiple-sided markets, big data, indirect network effects, multi-homing and the different conception of market power in digital markets have required a new approximation by antitrust authorities, both regarding merger control and in the investigation and prosecution of anticompetitive behavior.