The private investment in the concessions program of infrastructure in Peru will be US$M 13,700 for the period 1999-2001. Thus, it’s very important for this process to be accomplished in the best way. This means that the concession's winner will be the more efficient firm. The purpose of this work is to present, from auction theory, its most important applications over the concessions of infrastructure. Two of the methods used to define the auction variable are analized: Minimum Toll (fixed term) and Least Value Present of Income (variable term). Finally, we give some basic recommendations to achieve that the auction mechanism reaches the proposed objectives.

In September 1997, CTE set a new distribution rate after estimating the investment value, called New Replacement Value (VNR) for power distribution utilities in Peru. This estimation is an indispensable tool to set rates for 1997-2001 but raised a controversy between CTE and the regulated companies that reached the judiciary and generated a series of contradictory opinions on rate setting, regulation methods and LCE opinions.   A theoretical model of game theory show that if the agents acting maximizing profits, the Nash equilibrium will be appropriate by the LCE. Although, if there are exist a deviation by "populist" causes the equilibrium will be inefficient for the user but harmful for the company. In the next period, the companies will have incentives for underinvestment or recoil of the business but will never invest efficiently.   We concluded that the important question is not i...

The aim of this paper is to analyze the technical efficiency of the companies that operated on the electric power distribution sector in Peru from 1995 to 1998. For this purpose we will employ Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), and we will point out the main advantages and limitations of this technique. This well-known non-parametric and deterministic tool is used to empirically build the production frontier in this sector. Finally, we will discuss about the topic of efficiency in the public sector comparing the average performance according with the ownership of the capital for public, privatized and private companies. From this empirical analysis we conclude that the privatization process, per se, does not suppose improvements of efficiency respect to public companies if we do not capture others characteristics of the market.