This paper, drawing from what occurred before and after the pandemic, is a substantiation endeavour aimed at determining the grounds that authorize the imposition, by law, of the corporate duty to continue paying wages, despite not receiving -or even expecting- work in return. To this end, first, it shows that the law in force already provides a powerful legal reason to justify legislative interventions in this sense: the constitutionalized social dimension of wages. Subsequently, in order to support the constitutional principle in question, it argues that there are sufficient moral reasons to implement distributive mechanisms of business income that even cover cases in which it is factually impossible to offer work in exchange. Finally, appealing to the notion of “special positive duty”, it asserts that the aforementioned constitutional provision is the materialization in the labour...

This paper, drawing from what occurred before and after the pandemic, is a substantiation endeavour aimed at determining the grounds that authorize the imposition, by law, of the corporate duty to continue paying wages, despite not receiving -or even expecting- work in return. To this end, first, it shows that the law in force already provides a powerful legal reason to justify legislative interventions in this sense: the constitutionalized social dimension of wages. Subsequently, in order to support the constitutional principle in question, it argues that there are sufficient moral reasons to implement distributive mechanisms of business income that even cover cases in which it is factually impossible to offer work in exchange. Finally, appealing to the notion of “special positive duty”, it asserts that the aforementioned constitutional provision is the materialization in the labour...

This paper, drawing from what occurred before and after the pandemic, is a substantiation endeavour aimed at determining the grounds that authorize the imposition, by law, of the corporate duty to continue paying wages, despite not receiving -or even expecting- work in return. To this end, first, it shows that the law in force already provides a powerful legal reason to justify legislative interventions in this sense: the constitutionalized social dimension of wages. Subsequently, in order to support the constitutional principle in question, it argues that there are sufficient moral reasons to implement distributive mechanisms of business income that even cover cases in which it is factually impossible to offer work in exchange. Finally, appealing to the notion of “special positive duty”, it asserts that the aforementioned constitutional provision is the materialization in the labour...

This work studies constitutional bases of two essential institutions of Collective Labor Law: employer’s obligation to negotiate collectively and facultative arbitration. In relation to the first one, using tools provided bythe Theory of Law, it is argued that the section 28º of Peruvian Constitution establishes a collective negotiation concept as claim (not as permission) so, employers legal obligation of collective negotiation is constitutional. In theother hand, regarding facultative arbitration, it has constitutional support on state’s obligation to promote pacific ways to labor conflicts; even though, it is questioned that a «sub constitutional» rule has restrictively regulated this institution.

This work studies constitutional bases of two essential institutions of Collective Labor Law: employer’s obligation to negotiate collectively and facultative arbitration. In relation to the first one, using tools provided bythe Theory of Law, it is argued that the section 28º of Peruvian Constitution establishes a collective negotiation concept as claim (not as permission) so, employers legal obligation of collective negotiation is constitutional. In theother hand, regarding facultative arbitration, it has constitutional support on state’s obligation to promote pacific ways to labor conflicts; even though, it is questioned that a «sub constitutional» rule has restrictively regulated this institution.

This work studies constitutional bases of two essential institutions of Collective Labor Law: employer’s obligation to negotiate collectively and facultative arbitration. In relation to the first one, using tools provided bythe Theory of Law, it is argued that the section 28º of Peruvian Constitution establishes a collective negotiation concept as claim (not as permission) so, employers legal obligation of collective negotiation is constitutional. In theother hand, regarding facultative arbitration, it has constitutional support on state’s obligation to promote pacific ways to labor conflicts; even though, it is questioned that a «sub constitutional» rule has restrictively regulated this institution.