Two Senses of Massive Truth in Donald Davidson's Philosophy

• Autor: Melogno, Pablo
• Formato: artículo
• Fecha de Publicación: 2012
• Institución: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
• Repositorio: Revistas - Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
• Lenguaje: español
• OAI Identifier: oai:revistaspuc:article/3780
• Enlace del recurso: http://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/arete/article/view/3780
• Nivel de acceso: acceso abierto
• Materia: Davidson; belief; massive truth; massive error; skepticism; creencia; verdad masiva; error masivo; escepticismo

The present paper proposes a critical revision of the massive truth notion, in the context of Donald Davidson’s criticism to skepticism. It´s distinguished in Davidson’s work a cuantitative sense and a cualitative sense of the massive truth, asserting that the first one has been more frequently used and has had just an intuitive level of elucidation. The main problems associated to the cuantitative notion of massive truth are revised in relation to the quantification of beliefs, the detection of error on a background of truth and the application of the Davidsonian methodology to non perceptual beliefs. Over this revision it is proposed the substitution of the cuantitative notion of massive truth for a cualitative notion, and are analized its advantages over eventual skeptical objections.