On collusion sustainability with stacked reversion

Descripción del Articulo

We consider a multi-period oligopoly model to analyze cartel sustainability where a subset of collusive firms is exogenously given. We assume that in case of cheating only the cheater is expelled from the cartel and collusion continues without the cheater. We show that, in our model, when firms comp...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Escrihuela-Villar, Marc, Guillén, Jorge
Formato: artículo
Fecha de Publicación:2015
Institución:Universidad ESAN
Repositorio:ESAN-Institucional
Lenguaje:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:repositorio.esan.edu.pe:20.500.12640/2472
Enlace del recurso:https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12640/2472
https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677x.2011.11517458
Nivel de acceso:acceso abierto
Materia:Collusion
Stacked reversion
Trigger strategies
Colusión
Reversión apilada
Estrategias de activación
https://purl.org/pe-repo/ocde/ford#5.02.04
id ESAN_98137c6c29040bbd81eb24beb2a6b0b3
oai_identifier_str oai:repositorio.esan.edu.pe:20.500.12640/2472
network_acronym_str ESAN
network_name_str ESAN-Institucional
repository_id_str 4835
spelling Escrihuela-Villar, MarcGuillén, Jorge2021-09-30T16:58:03Z2021-09-30T16:58:03Z2015-11-09Escrihuela-Villar, M., & Guillén, J. (2011). On collusion sustainability with stacked reversion. Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja, 24(2), 89–98. https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677x.2011.11517458https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12640/2472https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677x.2011.11517458We consider a multi-period oligopoly model to analyze cartel sustainability where a subset of collusive firms is exogenously given. We assume that in case of cheating only the cheater is expelled from the cartel and collusion continues without the cheater. We show that, in our model, when firms compete in quantities and the cartel is sufficiently small, a Stackelberg leader cartel can always be sustained if firms are patient enough. Furthermore, in this case collusion is more easily sustained than when firms play grim trigger strategies. The opposite result is obtained in a price-setting supergame with differentiated products.application/pdfInglésengJuraj Dobrila University of PulaHRurn:issn:1331-677Xurn:issn:1848-9664https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1331677X.2011.11517458?needAccess=trueinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessAttribution 3.0 Unportedhttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/CollusionStacked reversionTrigger strategiesColusiónReversión apiladaEstrategias de activaciónhttps://purl.org/pe-repo/ocde/ford#5.02.04On collusion sustainability with stacked reversioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionArtículoreponame:ESAN-Institucionalinstname:Universidad ESANinstacron:ESANhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-4511-2108Acceso abiertoEconomic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja9828924ORIGINALguillen_2011.pdfguillen_2011.pdfTexto completoapplication/pdf421282https://repositorio.esan.edu.pe/bitstreams/f9a61cb4-1fca-4ed8-93bf-da01a98c1ba2/download2bb48e6e669c3d86068f63e6b70b5903MD51trueAnonymousREADTHUMBNAILguillen_2011.pdf.jpgguillen_2011.pdf.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg4011https://repositorio.esan.edu.pe/bitstreams/cc10ea3e-b14d-40ab-8086-50b43648e6a6/download9974072d464c610320351639ccc62c59MD55falseAnonymousREADTEXTguillen_2011.pdf.txtguillen_2011.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain33790https://repositorio.esan.edu.pe/bitstreams/c960a6ec-1406-41c8-8d58-1cabcfd4e2ed/download87b14a1b3c07ee40b88b89fb005c3d7eMD54falseAnonymousREAD20.500.12640/2472oai:repositorio.esan.edu.pe:20.500.12640/24722025-08-26 17:09:21.464https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessopen.accesshttps://repositorio.esan.edu.peRepositorio Institucional ESANrepositorio@esan.edu.pe
dc.title.en_EN.fl_str_mv On collusion sustainability with stacked reversion
title On collusion sustainability with stacked reversion
spellingShingle On collusion sustainability with stacked reversion
Escrihuela-Villar, Marc
Collusion
Stacked reversion
Trigger strategies
Colusión
Reversión apilada
Estrategias de activación
https://purl.org/pe-repo/ocde/ford#5.02.04
title_short On collusion sustainability with stacked reversion
title_full On collusion sustainability with stacked reversion
title_fullStr On collusion sustainability with stacked reversion
title_full_unstemmed On collusion sustainability with stacked reversion
title_sort On collusion sustainability with stacked reversion
author Escrihuela-Villar, Marc
author_facet Escrihuela-Villar, Marc
Guillén, Jorge
author_role author
author2 Guillén, Jorge
author2_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Escrihuela-Villar, Marc
Guillén, Jorge
dc.subject.en_EN.fl_str_mv Collusion
Stacked reversion
Trigger strategies
topic Collusion
Stacked reversion
Trigger strategies
Colusión
Reversión apilada
Estrategias de activación
https://purl.org/pe-repo/ocde/ford#5.02.04
dc.subject.es_ES.fl_str_mv Colusión
Reversión apilada
Estrategias de activación
dc.subject.ocde.none.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/pe-repo/ocde/ford#5.02.04
description We consider a multi-period oligopoly model to analyze cartel sustainability where a subset of collusive firms is exogenously given. We assume that in case of cheating only the cheater is expelled from the cartel and collusion continues without the cheater. We show that, in our model, when firms compete in quantities and the cartel is sufficiently small, a Stackelberg leader cartel can always be sustained if firms are patient enough. Furthermore, in this case collusion is more easily sustained than when firms play grim trigger strategies. The opposite result is obtained in a price-setting supergame with differentiated products.
publishDate 2015
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2021-09-30T16:58:03Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2021-09-30T16:58:03Z
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv 2015-11-09
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.version.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.other.none.fl_str_mv Artículo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.citation.none.fl_str_mv Escrihuela-Villar, M., & Guillén, J. (2011). On collusion sustainability with stacked reversion. Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja, 24(2), 89–98. https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677x.2011.11517458
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12640/2472
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677x.2011.11517458
identifier_str_mv Escrihuela-Villar, M., & Guillén, J. (2011). On collusion sustainability with stacked reversion. Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja, 24(2), 89–98. https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677x.2011.11517458
url https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12640/2472
https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677x.2011.11517458
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv eng
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
language eng
dc.relation.ispartof.none.fl_str_mv urn:issn:1331-677X
urn:issn:1848-9664
dc.relation.uri.none.fl_str_mv https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1331677X.2011.11517458?needAccess=true
dc.rights.*.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.en.fl_str_mv Attribution 3.0 Unported
dc.rights.uri.none.fl_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Attribution 3.0 Unported
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Juraj Dobrila University of Pula
dc.publisher.country.none.fl_str_mv HR
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Juraj Dobrila University of Pula
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:ESAN-Institucional
instname:Universidad ESAN
instacron:ESAN
instname_str Universidad ESAN
instacron_str ESAN
institution ESAN
reponame_str ESAN-Institucional
collection ESAN-Institucional
bitstream.url.fl_str_mv https://repositorio.esan.edu.pe/bitstreams/f9a61cb4-1fca-4ed8-93bf-da01a98c1ba2/download
https://repositorio.esan.edu.pe/bitstreams/cc10ea3e-b14d-40ab-8086-50b43648e6a6/download
https://repositorio.esan.edu.pe/bitstreams/c960a6ec-1406-41c8-8d58-1cabcfd4e2ed/download
bitstream.checksum.fl_str_mv 2bb48e6e669c3d86068f63e6b70b5903
9974072d464c610320351639ccc62c59
87b14a1b3c07ee40b88b89fb005c3d7e
bitstream.checksumAlgorithm.fl_str_mv MD5
MD5
MD5
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositorio Institucional ESAN
repository.mail.fl_str_mv repositorio@esan.edu.pe
_version_ 1843261682713886720
score 13.754011
On collusion sustainability with stacked reversion
Nota importante:
La información contenida en este registro es de entera responsabilidad de la institución que gestiona el repositorio institucional donde esta contenido este documento o set de datos. El CONCYTEC no se hace responsable por los contenidos (publicaciones y/o datos) accesibles a través del Repositorio Nacional Digital de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación de Acceso Abierto (ALICIA).

Ejemplares Similares